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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued twenty-six
precedential opinions in 2009 in the field of government contracts,
which includes appeals from the Boards of Contract Appeals
(“the Boards”), the United States Court of Federal Claims (COFC) in
1
disputes subject to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), and appeals

1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(3), (10) (2006) (providing for appellate review of
COFC and Board of Contract Appeals decisions in the Federal Circuit); id.
§ 1491(a)(2) (“The Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor . . . including a
dispute concerning termination of a contract, rights in tangible or intangible
property, compliance with cost accounting standards, and other nonmonetary
disputes . . . .”); 41 U.S.C. § 607(d), (g)(1)(A) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over
contract disputes to the Boards of Contract Appeals and providing for appellate
review of Board decisions in the Federal Circuit); § 609(a) (granting jurisdiction over
contract disputes to the COFC).
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from the COFC in bid protests and non-CDA contract disputes.
Although government contracts decisions continue to represent a
3
relatively small portion of the Federal Circuit’s case law, the opinions
issued in 2009 reflect significant developments in the court’s
government contracts jurisprudence.
Practitioners in this field should note four aspects of the 2009
decisions in particular. First, the Federal Circuit issued a host of
significant bid protest decisions last year. The seven precedential
opinions issued in 2009 substantially exceed the law generated in this
area in any of the previous five years (during which the court issued
4
5
one precedential bid protest opinion in 2008, three in 2007, one in
6
7
8
2006, four in 2005, and three in 2004 ). More importantly, the
court’s decision in each of these appeals favored the Government
and emphasized the need for judicial restraint and deference to
procuring officials. In four appeals, the Federal Circuit reversed
(at least in part) a trial court’s decision in favor of the protester, and
in three of these reversals, the court expressed concern that the trial
court had exceeded the scope of its review. In Weeks Marine, Inc. v.

2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(3), 1491(a)(2), 1491(b)(1) (2006) (vesting the
Federal Circuit with appellate review of “an action by an interested party objecting to
a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to
a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or
regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement”).
3. These decisions account for ten percent of the precedential opinions issued
by the Federal Circuit in 2009. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, Opinions & Orders, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/dailylog.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2010).
4. See Sheryl L. Floyd et al., 2008 Government Contract Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2009) (discussing Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of
Defense, 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
5. See Hon. Mary Ellen Coster Williams, 2007 Government Contract Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1088 (2008) (discussing Chapman Law Firm
Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Blue & Gold Fleet v.
United States, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Avtel Servs., Inc. v. United States,
501 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
6. See David W. Burgett et al., 2006 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1073, 1106 (2007) (discussing Rex Serv. Corp. v. United
States, 448 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
7. See Robert E. Korroch et al., 2005 Year in Review: Analysis of Significant Federal
Circuit Government Contracts Decisions, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 581, 612 (2006) (discussing
Rice Servs. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2005), Bannum, Inc. v. United
States, 404 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005), Kentucky v. United States, 424 F.3d 1222
(Fed. Cir. 2005), and Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 413 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2005), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
8. See David Robbins, 2004 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 1205, 1222 (2005) (discussing PGBA, LLC v. United States, 389
F.3d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2004), Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2004), and NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
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9

United States, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s judgment in
favor of the protester, concluding that if it were to find that the
agency lacked a rational basis for its decision, it “would be secondguessing the Corps’s action,” which the court is “not permitted to
10
11
do.” Similarly, in Alabama Aircraft Industries v. United States, the
Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s judgment against the
Government, concluding that the COFC’s ruling effectively
“introduce[d] new requirements outside the scope of the RFP” and
12
exceeded the scope of the trial court’s review. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the Federal Circuit in Axiom Resource Management,
13
Inc. v. United States, reiterated that the COFC’s review of bid protests
under the Tucker Act is limited to the administrative record and
admonished that “supplementation of the record should be limited
to cases in which ‘the omission of extra-record evidence precludes
14
effective judicial review.’”
Axiom, in particular, will lead to further litigation over (1) what
constitutes “effective judicial review,” (2) what sort of extra-record
evidence may be “necessary” to provide such review if the record is
inadequate, and (3) how much discretion the COFC has to decide
these issues. Nevertheless, the unmistakable theme of the Federal
Circuit’s 2009 bid protest decisions is the court’s focus on the limits
of judicial review of federal procurement decisions.
Second, the Federal Circuit upheld one of the largest judgments
ever reported against a contractor under the anti-fraud provision of
15
the CDA in Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co. v. United States.
The decision in Daewoo is important not only for the size of the
judgment levied against the contractor for submitting a fraudulent
claim, but also because the line drawn between the amount of the
claim that was fraudulent and the amount that was not fraudulent
continues to raise more questions than it answers. Given the everincreasing focus on allegations of contractor fraud in the media,
Congress, and the Executive Branch, Daewoo underscores the stakes
involved in such allegations and deserves an especially close reading
by all members of the government contracts bar.

9. 575 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
10. Id. at 1371.
11. 586 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
12. Id. at 1376.
13. 564 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
14. Id. at 1380 (quoting Murakami v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 731, 735 (2000),
aff’d, 398 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
15. 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Third, the Federal Circuit continued to decide questions of
contract interpretation according to its view of the “plain meaning”
of the contract language at issue, in some cases concluding that this
plain meaning had eluded the lower tribunal. The most significant
16
of these decisions is Bell BCI Co. v. United States, in which a divided
panel of the court ruled that boilerplate release language in a
bilateral modification barred a contractor’s claims for the cumulative
17
and disruptive impact of multiple change orders. Over a vigorous
18
dissent, the panel majority held that the release language
unambiguously discharged claims for cumulative impact and
disruption, notwithstanding the absence of any reference to
“cumulative impact” or “disruption” in the modification and the
Government’s failure to introduce any evidence that the parties
19
intended to release such claims.
Finally, the Federal Circuit issued two significant decisions
addressing cost accounting issues in 2009, both of which were adverse
to contractors asserting claims against the government. In Geren v.
20
Tecom, Inc., the court established a two-part analysis to determine if
defense and settlement costs associated with third-party, sexual
harassment litigation are allowable charges on a government
21
contract.
First, the COFC or Board of Contract Appeals must
examine whether damages or penalties resulting from an adverse
22
judgment would be disallowed under the contract. If not, the costs
are unallowable “unless the contractor can establish that the private
23
Title VII plaintiff had very little likelihood of success on the merits.”
24
And in Gates v. Raytheon Co., the court held that under Cost
Accounting Standard 413-50, contractors must make an adjustment
during the current accounting period for the sale, discontinued
25
operations, or other closure of a business segment.
Moreover,
26
interest on the repayment amount will be compounded daily.
This article discusses twenty-four of the twenty-six precedent-setting
opinions involving government contract law issues, setting forth the
16. 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
17. Id. at 1341.
18. Id. at 1344 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority ignored the
sound findings of the trial court, which concluded “that the parties did not intend to
release all possible future claims for cumulative impact of the many changes”).
19. Id. at 1341 (majority opinion).
20. 566 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
21. Id. at 1041.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1046.
24. 584 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
25. Id. at 1067–68.
26. Id. at 1070.
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relevant facts, the Federal Circuit’s analysis, and—where
appropriate—the ramifications of these cases. The decisions are
grouped into four categories: (I) bid protests/contract formation;
(II) fraud; (III) contract performance disputes; and (IV) Winstar and
27
Spent Nuclear Fuel cases.
27. The two precedential opinions not discussed below are American Contractors
Indemnity Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Cambridge v. United
States, 558 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In American Contractors, the Federal Circuit
reversed the COFC’s dismissal for failure to state a claim in a dispute regarding a
security bond guarantee agreement with the Small Business Administration (SBA).
570 F.3d at 1377. The COFC held that the surety had presented no evidence that the
increase in the amount of the bond guaranty had been approved by the SBA before
the surety agreed to the increase, as required by the SBA regulations for guarantee of
surety bonds. Id. at 1374–75. The contract ride approving the increased bond
guaranty was dated before the date of the SBA approval, but the surety claimed that
it is common practice in the surety industry to “back date” bond increases to match
the date of a contract change order. Id. at 1375. The Federal Circuit held that the
relevant date for determining SBA liability under the regulations was not the bond’s
effective date, which was relied on by the COFC, but instead “the date the surety
‘agrees to or acquiesces in’ a material change to a bond.” Id. at 1376 (quoting
13 C.F.R. § 115.19(e) (2009)). Because “back dating” is not barred by the regulation
in question, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he mere existence of an earlier
effective date [than the date of SBA approval] thus does not establish a violation of
13 C.F.R. § 115.19(e).” Id. at 1377. It therefore was improper for the COFC to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, although the Federal Circuit held
open the possibility that the Government might show on a motion for summary
judgment that the surety violated the regulation, and therefore the terms of the
surety guarantee agreement, by modifying the bond without first obtaining approval
from the SBA. Id.
In Cambridge, the majority decision affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of a claim
against the United States that Diahann Cambridge was owed a further award based
on her role as an informant who provided the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with
information about tax law violations by a named individual. 558 F.3d 1331, 1332,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In her complaint, Ms. Cambridge alleged that in September,
1989 she provided the IRS with information that eventually led to the “detection of a
tax violation committed by her former husband, Mr. David E. Pierce, in his
capacity as the owner of Harold’s Chicken Shacks.” Id. at 1333. Subsequently,
Ms. Cambridge filed a Form 211, Application for Reward for Original Information
with the IRS in January 1991 and received two reward payments of $1,131 in
February 1997 and $3,429 in February 1998. Id. In January 2007, however, the IRS
notified Ms. Cambridge that no further reward money would be distributed to her
and that her Application for Reward was considered finalized. Id. Ms. Cambridge
subsequently filed a complaint at the COFC in March 2007 seeking the “balance due”
on her claim for reward based on 26 U.S.C. § 7623, which allows the Secretary of
Treasury to pay a reward to individuals as a result of their help in detecting and
bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating tax laws. Id.
The COFC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that any
contractual obligation that the IRS had was limited to the two reward amounts it had
already provided to Ms. Cambridge and that Ms. Cambridge had failed to specify any
agreement she had with the IRS regarding any additional payments or any actual
balance owed. Cambridge v. United States, No. 07-142T, 2007 WL 1888888, at *2
(Fed. Cl. May 29, 2007). The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s decision, holding
that Ms. Cambridge had failed to meet her burden under Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to allege facts “plausibly” showing that the IRS had
negotiated and fixed a specific amount as her reward. Cambridge, 558 F.3d at 1335.
The Court held that Ms. Cambridge’s allegation that, as a result of the information
she had provided, the IRS had recovered additional taxes from her ex-husband failed
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BID PROTESTS/CONTRACT FORMATION

Judicial restraint and deference were the primary themes of the
Federal Circuit’s bid protest decisions in 2009. In all seven of the bid
protest decisions discussed below, the Federal Circuit sided primarily
with the Government, and in three of those decisions the Federal
Circuit reversed (at least in part) the COFC’s decision on the
grounds that the trial court had exceeded the Administrative
Procedure Act’s narrow scope of review. The impact of at least one of
28
these decisions, Axiom Resource Management, Inc. v. United States, is
still subject to vigorous debate in recent COFC decisions, as the trial
court attempts to determine whether Axiom should be limited to its
unique facts or whether it signals a new trend of judicial restraint in
the development of the administrative record.
The Federal Circuit’s decisions also provide helpful guidance in
29
procedural areas. In two cases, Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States and
30
Labatt Food Services, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
articulated the standards to be applied to determine whether
31
a protester has standing, highlighting the difference between
pre-award and post-award protests. In Weeks Marine, the Federal
Circuit concluded that a protester had standing to file a pre-award
protest challenging the framework of a competition based on a
minimal showing of likely direct harm; the dissent criticized the
majority’s theory of standing, noting that it seemed “the claimed
32
illegality of the solicitation is itself sufficient to establish injury.”
to state a claim because even if this allegation were correct, it did not suggest that the
IRS agreed to pay a fixed additional award to Ms. Cambridge. Id. Furthermore,
nothing else in the record, including the letters from the IRS suggesting that there
was “a possibility” that she might receive an additional award, “support[ed] the
existence of the required agreement on the part of the government.” Id.
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that the “panel majority depart[ed] from the
statute and its purpose by holding that no reward need be paid to a tax informer
absent a prior express agreement with the IRS to pay a reward and specifying the
amount of reward or how it will be measured.” Id. at 1337 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Judge Newman argued that there was no “controlling distinction” between the facts
presented in Cambridge’s complaint and the facts present in Merrick v. United States,
846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and that, “[a]pplying Merrick, an implied-in-fact
contract came into existence at least when a reward payment was made to Ms.
Cambridge, for the IRS acknowledged that she had provided information that
warranted a reward.” Cambridge, 558 F.3d at 1338, 1340.
28. 564 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
29. 575 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
30. 577 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
31. See Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1363 (concluding that a “prospective bidder or
offeror must establish ‘a non-trivial competitive injury which can be redressed by
judicial relief’ to meet the standing requirement”); Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1379 (noting
that “an unsuccessful bidder who alleges harmful error in a government bid contest
in which he has an economic interest has the requisite standing to sue”).
32. Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1373.
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By contrast, in Labatt, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s
decision on standing in a post-award protest on the grounds that the
protester had demonstrated only a superficial procedural error in the
source selection, but failed to make any “showing of how the
government’s error caused Labatt to suffer disparate treatment or
33
particularized harm.”
A. Axiom Resource Management, Inc. v. United States
Axiom Resource Management protested the award of a military
health care support services contract to Lockheed Martin Federal
Healthcare, Inc. based on the alleged existence of an unmitigated
34
organizational conflict of interest (OCI).
After two rounds of
protest before the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and two
rounds of corrective action by the agency, each resulting in award of
35
the contract to Lockheed, the GAO denied Axiom’s third protest.
36
After allowing unlimited
Axiom then protested in the COFC.
supplementation of the administrative record, the COFC found that
the contracting officer (CO) had abused his discretion by awarding
the contract to Lockheed without developing an adequate OCI
37
mitigation plan. After further briefing and a request for advice from
the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition, the COFC
enjoined the Government from exercising the option years on
38
Lockheed’s contract. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the
39
COFC decision and held that the decision in Esch v. Yeutter, on
which the COFC had relied, is not the law of the Federal Circuit for
40
supplementing the administrative record.
The Federal Circuit
further held that the COFC had applied an incorrect standard of
review to the CO’s action—the COFC should have applied the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure
41
Act (APA) rather than a “reasonableness” standard.
Before the COFC, Axiom requested to supplement the
administrative record with “legal pleadings filed before the GAO,
declarations of Axiom’s employees, and declarations from
33. Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1380.
34. Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
35. In re Axiom Res. Mgmt, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-298870.3, B-98870.4, July 12, 2007,
2007 CPD ¶ 117, at *3, *8.
36. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1378.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 876 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
40. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1381.
41. Id. at 1381–82.
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42

consultants retained for litigation.”
When the Government
objected, the COFC judge stated that it was her practice “to allow
everybody to put . . . whatever they want to put into the record in trial
43
and even in an administrative record to supplement.” The Federal
Circuit explained that “supplementation of the record should be
limited to cases in which ‘the omission of extra-record evidence
44
precludes effective judicial review.’” The Federal Circuit concluded
that the COFC had erred by allowing supplementation of the record
without first “evaluating whether the record before the agency was
45
sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review.” The court further
noted that the exceptions to record supplementation in Esch v. Yeutter
had been based on a law review article written before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory
46
Commission and that even the D.C. Circuit had backed away from
47
Esch’s broad exceptions in recent years.
On the merits, the Federal Circuit held that the CO had acted
reasonably in determining that the OCI mitigation plan submitted by
48
Lockheed was sufficient to mitigate the alleged conflicts of interest.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit concluded that the COFC erred when,
without any evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct by the CO,
it directed the Government to set aside Lockheed’s contract or
submit to ongoing court monitoring based on the “unenforceability”
49
of Lockheed’s OCI mitigation plan.
In the first few months following the Federal Circuit’s decision,
while acknowledging that “Axiom clearly signaled the Federal Circuit’s
adoption of a ‘more restrictive’ view of the permissible scope for
50
supplementation of the record in a bid protest,” judges at the COFC
nonetheless have used bid protest decisions to debate the import of
51
Axiom. Two decisions have even declared that the COFC “does not
interpret the new guidelines in Axiom to change the trial court’s
42. Id. at 1379.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1380 (quoting Murakami v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 731, 735 (2000),
aff’d, 398 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
45. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1380.
46. 470 U.S. 729 (1985).
47. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1380.
48. Id. at 1383.
49. Id. at 1384.
50. PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-476 C, 2009 WL 3808619, at *2
(Fed. Cl. Nov. 10, 2009) (quoting Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1380–81); see also Kerr
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 312, 334 (2009); L-3 Commc’ns
EOTech, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 656, 671 (2009) (recognizing and applying
the restrictive standard for supplementation adopted by the Axiom panel).
51. L-3 Commc’ns EOTech, 87 Fed. Cl. at 671.
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practice, other than to emphasize restraint and adherence to
52
Court of Federal Claims opinions also have
precedent.”
distinguished between extra-record evidence that bears on the
reasonableness of the agency’s decision-making and “evidentiary
53
submissions that go to the prospective relief sought.” The COFC in
those cases admitted evidence related to such issues as the relative
harms of granting injunctive relief and the potential effect of such
relief on national security, “not as a supplement to the administrative
54
record, but as part of [the COFC’s] record.”
Similarly, while at least one COFC judge has noted that the viability
55
of any of the Esch factors “remain[s] unclear” after Axiom, another
has held that four of the eight Esch factors are still viable after Axiom:
(1) [W]hen the agency action is not adequately explained in the
record before the court; (2) when the agency failed to consider
factors which are relevant to its final decision; (3) when an agency
considered evidence which it failed to include in the record; . . .
(8) in cases where relief is at issue, especially at the preliminary
56
injunction stage.

COFC decisions that have applied Axiom outside the context of
remedies have more often than not allowed the requesting parties to
supplement the record, including in the following bid protest
situations: (1) document “should have been included” in the record
because it contained contemporaneous communications between the

52. Totolo/King v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 680, 693 (2009); RhinoCorps Ltd. v.
United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 261, 273 n.13 (2009); see also Global Computer Enters., Inc.
v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 52, 62 (2009) (stating that the COFC’s pre-Axiom
principles for supplementation of the record “remain viable, even after the Federal
Circuit eschewed reliance upon the specific, broad exceptions enunciated by the Esch
court under the circumstances presented in Axiom”).
53. PlanetSpace, 2009 WL 3808619, at *3; see also AshBritt, Inc. v. United States,
87 Fed. Cl. 344, 366–67 (2009) (“In general, it is appropriate to add evidence
pertaining to prejudice and the factors governing injunctive relief to the record in a
bid protest—not as a supplement to the AR, but as part of this Court’s record.”),
amended by, 87 Fed. Cl. 654 (2009); Totolo/King, 87 Fed. Cl. at 692–93 (discussing why
“the administrative record may be supplemented . . . in cases where relief is at issue,
especially at the preliminary injunction stage”).
54. PlanetSpace, 2009 WL 3808619, at *3; see also Akal Sec. Inc. v. United States,
87 Fed. Cl. 311, 320 n.8 (2009) (“Because the ‘balance of harms’ prong of the test for
preliminary injunctive relief looks to matters outside the record of award, the court
finds that the ‘omission of extra-record evidence’ would frustrate or preclude
‘effective judicial review.’” (quoting Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1379–80, and Murakami,
46 Fed. Cl. at 735)).
55. PlanetSpace, 2009 WL 3808619, at *7.
56. Totolo/King, 87 Fed. Cl. at 692–93 (citing Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991
(D.C. Cir. 1989)) (permitting supplementation of the record with an affidavit from
plaintiff that “provid[ed] evidentiary support . . . for the reasonable inferences drawn
and arguments made from existing record facts”); accord RhinoCorps, 87 Fed. Cl. at
273 n.13.
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57

agency and the protester; (2) material was necessary to correct
58
“erroneous and misleading” information in the record;
(3) documents necessary to provide the court a complete
understanding of the “multitude of issues” and “enormous amount of
59
information” presented by the parties; (4) post-protest affidavit
explaining the agency’s intent when using a specific phrase in its
evaluation was “necessary to ensure ‘meaningful’ and ‘effective’
judicial review” because “[t]he record without the affidavit does not
60
explicitly reflect the answer to this question” of the agency’s intent;
and (5) documents in question were explicitly referenced in the
61
agency’s source selection analysis.
The COFC will likely continue to grapple with the effect of Axiom
on the scope of the administrative record following an initial protest
filed at the GAO. The court’s rules state that “core documents
relevant to a protest case may include, as appropriate . . . the record of
any previous administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the
procurement, including the record of any other protest of the
62
procurement.”
Some COFC decisions appear to interpret this
permissive rule to mean that the COFC must include the entire record
before the GAO in the COFC administrative record rather than the
limited GAO documents that the Competition in Contracting Act
63
requires. In general, COFC decisions have reconciled Axiom with
57. Kerr Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 312, 335 (2009).
58. AshBritt, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 344, 366 (2009), amended by,
87 Fed. Cl. 654 (2009).
59. Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 52, 62–63 (2009).
60. Academy Facilities Mgmt. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 441, 455 (2009).
61. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 184, 189 (2009). The COFC also
has refused to supplement the administrative record in other circumstances, such as
(1) when photographs were not before the agency during its decision-making and a
declaration was duplicative of information in the record or irrelevant to the issue at
hand, Kerr Contractors, 89 Fed. Cl. at 335; (2) when a declaration merely offered the
Contracting Officer’s opinion on what the court viewed as a legal issue, AshBritt,
87 Fed. Cl. at 366; and (3) when declarations and exhibits related to test scores the
court had determined were the result of improper testing procedures and post-hoc
declaration of fact and argument was not before the agency during its decisionmaking, L-3 Commc’ns EOTech, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 656, 672 (2009)
(noting that the existing record “adequately describes the issues in controversy and
the decision-making of the Army”).
62. CT. FED. CL. R., App. C, ¶ 22(u) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Bannum, 89 Fed. Cl. at 188 (“[T]he purpose of the rule . . . is to
ensure that the Court at least has benefit of the same record that was before the
GAO. Materials considered by the GAO should, therefore, also be part of the record
reviewed by this Court.” (emphasis added)); Holloway & Co. v. United States, 87 Fed.
Cl. 381, 391 (2009) (“Each of the documents proffered by Holloway relates to the
protests before GAO and falls into this category [of Appendix C, ¶ 22(u)]. By rule,
the record therefore should include these materials.” (emphasis added)); DataPath, Inc.
v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 162, 166 n.3 (2009) (“The Axiom panel also may have
misunderstood that the trial court did not ‘supplement’ the Administrative Record,
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the court’s rules to conclude that material included in the record
before the GAO also should be included in the administrative record
64
At least one COFC decision disagrees with this
at the COFC.
65
premise, although the language is contained in dicta. In another
example, the COFC deemed a post-award declaration to be part of
the administrative record because it was included in the record for
another protest of the same procurement before the GAO, yet cited
Axiom to explain why the court gave no weight to the declaration,
66
which was not supported by the pre-award record.
B. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States
Weeks Marine, Inc., a dredging contractor, filed a pre-award bid
protest in the COFC challenging the Army Corps of Engineers’
(the Corps) decision to solicit proposals for regional maintenance
dredging and shore protection projects using multiple award,
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) task order contracts,
67
rather than sealed bidding procedures. The COFC granted Weeks’s
motion for judgment on the administrative record, ruling that the
Corps’ solicitation violated 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2), which provides
that sealed bidding must be used when an agency plans to award a
contract based solely on price and price-related factors, and finding
that the Corps lacked a rational basis for departing from its
traditional district-by-district procurement strategy, in which
because [Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims] Appendix C, ¶ 22(u)
provides that declarations filed in a prior protest before the General Accountability
Office [sic] are part of the Administrative Record.” (emphasis added)); Red River
Holdings, LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 768, 788 n.28 (noting that the COFC’s
rules “provide[] that declarations filed in a prior GAO protest are part of the
[Administrative Record]” (citing DataPath, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 162, 166
(2009) (emphasis added)). See 31 U.S.C. § 3556 (for protests filed at the COFC after
a GAO protest, the initial agency report, any reports to Congress and any decision or
recommendation by GAO “shall be considered to be part of the agency record
subject to review.”).
64. See Holloway, 87 Fed. Cl. at 391–92 (acknowledging Axiom in a decision
granting motion to supplement the COFC record with material included in record
before the GAO); Bannum, 89 Fed. Cl. at 189 (“The Federal Circuit’s recent decision
in Axiom, does not undermine the Court’s rules for determining the content of the
administration record.”); see also Acad. Facilities Mgmt. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl.
441, 454–55 (2009) (noting that under Holloway, a post-hoc affidavit by the Source
Selection Authority that was part of the record before the GAO would be admitted
into the record at the COFC).
65. See RhinoCorps Ltd. Co. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 261, 276 n.18 (2009)
(disagreeing with Holloway and stating that documents generated after the agency
decision and in the course of an administrative protest may be cited “as admissions
or inconsistent positions” but cannot supplement the administrative record before
the COFC).
66. Red River Holdings, 87 Fed. Cl. at 787–88.
67. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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individual dredging efforts were sourced locally through sealed
68
bidding. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court,
holding that the solicitation for the regional multiple award contracts
did call for evaluation of non-price factors, and that the solicitation
69
was rationally designed to address several of the Corps’ goals.
Weeks Marine is notable for two reasons. First, it clearly articulates
the Circuit’s standard for establishing standing in a pre-award protest
challenging the terms of a solicitation, and clarifies the previously
implicit distinction between the types of harm a plaintiff must
demonstrate in a pre-award versus a post-award protest. Second,
in reversing the COFC’s decision, the Weeks Marine reiterates the
recent emphasis on judicial restraint, which was also emphasized in
the Axiom and Alabama Aircraft Industries decisions this year.
The court recognized that it had not previously articulated the
standard that should be applied in a pre-award protest to determine
whether a prospective offeror has an economic interest, and
therefore prejudice, sufficient to establish standing to challenge a
70
solicitation. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), standing “is limited to
actual or prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic
interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by the
71
failure to award the contract.” On appeal, the Corps argued that
Weeks failed to demonstrate prejudice or harm arising from the
Corps’ solicitation, and that any potential injury would be speculative
72
and shared by all bidders. The Corps drew upon the standard for
establishing standing in post-award bid protests, in which “[t]o establish
prejudice, the protester must show that there was a ‘substantial
chance’ it would have received the contract award but for the alleged
73
error in the procurement process.” Weeks, in contrast, argued that
it would suffer prejudice from competing in a “discretionary,
subjective and essentially unreviewable process,” and that its
74
long-term marketing strategy was based upon sealed bidding.
The court observed that “[i]n such a case [i.e., a pre-award
protest], it is difficult for a prospective bidder/offeror to make the
showing of prejudice that we have required in post-award bid protest

68. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 22, 29-30 (2007).
69. Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1364.
70. Id. at 1361.
71. Id. at 1359 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. United States, 258 F.3d
1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
72. Id. at 1360.
73. Id. (quoting Info Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
74. Id.
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cases” because “there is no factual foundation for a ‘but for’
75
prejudice analysis.” The COFC had applied a standard that had
previously been articulated in WinStar Communications, Inc. v. United
76
States, in which standing is established by alleging “a non-trivial
77
competitive injury which can be redressed by judicial relief.”
The Federal Circuit determined that this standard “strikes the
appropriate balance” between § 1491(b)(1)’s “interested party”
requirements and Article III standing requirements, and agreed that
it is the appropriate standard to apply in a pre-award challenge to an
78
agency’s solicitation.
The court subsequently determined that
Weeks had standing because it had alleged a facial defect in the
solicitation that would materially affect how Weeks would be required
79
to do business with the Corps for the duration of the IDIQ contract.
The court then turned to the merits of Weeks’s claim, focusing on
whether the Corps established a rational basis for structuring its
procurement. The COFC had sustained Weeks’s protest on the basis
that the agency’s Acquisition Plan failed to establish a rational basis
for departing from traditional sealed bidding procedures and relying
instead on negotiated task order awards that would purportedly focus
80
on non-price factors, in addition to price. Among other findings,
the COFC determined that it was unlikely that the Corps intended to
make task order awards based on non-price factors, because its
non-price factors appeared to focus largely on matters for which a
responsibility determination under Federal Acquisition Regulation
81
(FAR) § 9.104 would suffice instead. The Corps therefore would be
required to use traditional sealed bidding procedures under
82
Moreover, the court was not persuaded by
10 U.S.C. § 2304.

75. Id.
76. 41 Fed. Cl. 748 (1998).
77. Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1361.
78. Id. at 1362.
79. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk disagreed that Weeks had standing,
noting that “Weeks Marine made no allegations of injury in its complaint and
appears to have filed no affidavits or declarations providing a basis for finding that
the solicitation was likely to cause injury.” Id. at 1371–72 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that “[t]he majority’s theory [of standing] appears to be that the
claimed illegality of the solicitation is itself sufficient to establish injury,” but that this
was not sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing. Id. at 1373–74 (citing Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984)) (“[A]n asserted right to have the Government act
in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a
federal court.”). Instead, the dissent would have required a showing that Weeks’s
“direct economic interests have been adversely affected” to qualify as an “interested
party” that had standing to protest. Id. at 1375–76.
80. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 22, 28–34 (2007).
81. Id. at 30.
82. Id.
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additional justifications identified in the Acquisition Plan—including
a reduced procurement cycle, reduced administrative costs, reduced
need for emergency contracting, and eliminating inter-district
83
competition for limited resources. The court generally concluded
that the Acquisition Plan and other sparse record documentation
failed to sufficiently justify the planned change to a regional,
negotiated task order contract because the court did not believe that
the benefits the agency anticipated from the changed strategy were
84
material.
On appeal, the Corps noted that the solicitation on its face called
for the evaluation of non-price factors including technical merit, past
performance, and small business concerns, and therefore properly
qualified as a permissible negotiated procurement, not a sealed
85
bidding procedure. It further pointed out “that ‘past performance
is considered significantly more important than price,’ and that
‘all evaluation factors, when combined, are significantly more
86
important than price.’” On that basis, the Federal Circuit agreed
that the solicitation did not violate 10 U.S.C. § 2304, and that it was
87
not a sealed bid. Thus, the court determined that the issue was
“whether the Government established a rational basis for the
88
structuring of the procurement.”
As for the merits of the Corps’ decision to change its acquisition
strategy, the Corps argued that the COFC erred in concluding that
the benefits the Corps expected to derive from the change in
procurement strategy did not constitute a rational basis for making
that change, and that there were seven specific benefits that the
agency anticipated, including the ability to:
(1) pick more qualified contractors because [the Corps] will be
able to rely on factors other than price; (2) reduce procurement
time; (3) lower administrative costs by an estimated $1.45 million
in the next two years; (4) reduce or eliminate the need for
emergency procurements; (5) have greater coordination between
individual districts of the South Atlantic Division; (6) facilitate the
use of small businesses; and (7) promote national security through
89
more timely execution of dredging near military bases.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 32–34.
Id. at 34.
Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1364–65.
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90

Citing CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
explained that when an agency identifies concerns or reasons for a
procurement strategy in the administrative record and those
concerns provide a rational basis for the procurement decision, the
agency need not provide additional evidence that supports those
91
concerns. Applying that rule here, the Federal Circuit determined
that the Corps had provided “seven specific reasons for its
procurement action, each of which represents a legitimate
92
procurement objective.”
Although the Corps did not provide
empirical evidence showing how each of these goals would bear out,
it did identify the “reasons for its procurement decision and the
thinking behind those reasons,” which provided a sufficient rational
93
basis for that decision.
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that if it were to find that
the agency lacked a rational basis for its decision, it “would be
second-guessing the Corps’s action. That is something we are not
94
permitted to do.” It quoted its earlier statement in Honeywell, Inc. v.
95
United States, that “[i]f the court finds a reasonable basis for the
agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even though it might,
as an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to
the proper administration and application of the procurement
96
regulations.”
C. Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. United States
Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. (“AAII”) protested the Air Force’s
award of a multi-billion dollar contract to the Boeing Company for
long-term maintenance (five-year base period, plus five one-year
97
options) of the KC-135 aerial refueling tanker aircraft fleet.
After the COFC sustained AAII’s protest, the Federal Circuit reversed,
concluding that the COFC’s ruling effectively “introduce[d] new
requirements outside the scope of the RFP” and exceeded the scope
98
of the trial court’s review.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
2009).
98.

552 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
870 F.2d 644 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Honeywell, 870 F.2d at 648).
Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1376.
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AAII had previously protested the award at the GAO in 2007,
at which time the GAO sustained the protest on the sole ground
that the record was insufficient for the GAO to determine
99
the reasonableness of the Air Force’s price realism analysis.
GAO signaled concerns with Boeing’s proposed labor hour
reductions in light of the fact that the KC-135 fleet would continue to
100
age during the life of the contract.
Following the protest, the Air
Force reevaluated the realism of the offerors’ proposed prices and
documented factors supporting its conclusion that proposed prices
101
were realistic and reasonable.
The Air Force “noted that because
aging aircraft issues were not predictable with any certainty, the RFP
instructed offerors to base their proposals on a three-tier work
package” included in the RFP, and also “provided for the [Air Force]
to negotiate new work packages as might be needed in future
102
The Air Force thus concluded that it was not required to
years.”
103
consider aging-aircraft issues in its price realism analysis.
The Air
Force affirmed the award to Boeing, and AAII protested to the GAO
again, but, in light of the Air Force’s rationale for its price realism
104
analysis, the GAO denied the second protest.
AAII subsequently protested the award at the COFC, which granted
105
The COFC found the Air
AAII’s request for injunctive relief.
Force’s price realism analysis to be arbitrary and capricious because it
106
sought “to sidestep the aging-fleet issue.”
The COFC concluded
that the solicitation did not “explicitly” or adequately address agingaircraft issues, as the Air Force contended, and that the Air Force
therefore should have considered aging-aircraft issues in conjunction
107
with its price realism analysis. The Air Force and Boeing appealed
108
the COFC’s decision.
109
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC. Noting that
the central concern in the COFC’s decision was “the issue of aging
aircraft,” the Federal Circuit agreed with the COFC “that the issue of
110
aging aircraft was not explicitly addressed in the Air Force’s RFP.”
99. Id. at 1374.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 666, 703 (2008), rev’d
586 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
106. Id. at 700.
107. Id.
108. Ala. Aircraft, 586 F.3d at 1374.
109. See id. at 1376 (vacating the injunction against the Boeing contract).
110. Id. at 1375.
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However, the Federal Circuit noted that due to the unpredictability
of aging-aircraft impacts on maintenance requirements, the agency
had elected to require the offerors instead to propose prices for
specific work packages:
The agency decided to handle the uncertainties associated with the
maintenance of aging aircraft by requiring offerors to base their
proposals on a work package that included three elements . . .
[and] [t]he RFP explained to offerors exactly how their price
proposals would be evaluated based on their prices for these
various elements of the work package. The agency believed that
this comprehensive framework, along with the periodic
adjustments to the work package contemplated by the RFP, was the
111
best way to account for the uncertain impact of aging aircraft.

Although the Air Force determined that this was the best approach,
the Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he trial court thought otherwise”
because the COFC found “that the RFP should have explicitly
112
addressed the problem of aging aircraft.”
As a result of that
finding, the COFC “attempt[ed] to rewrite the RFP to account for the
impact of aging aircraft in the manner the court preferred [and]
113
went beyond the scope of the court’s review . . . .”
As a result, the
COFC’s decision “amounted to an impermissible substitution of the
court’s judgment for the agency’s with regard to how the contract
114
work should be designed.”
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit determined that the Air Force had
considered the aging-aircraft issue, “but because the impact on future
requirements was unknown, it decided the best approach was to
provide all offerors with the three-tier work package on which to base
115
their proposals.”
Since it was within the agency’s discretion to
organize its competition in that fashion, the Air Force’s subsequent
price realism analysis based on the announced work packages was not
116
arbitrary and capricious.
D. Labatt Food Service, Inc. v. United States
The Labatt decision provides further guidance regarding standing
in post-award protests and, in particular, clarifies the notion that not
all violations of procurement law or regulation during a competition
result in prejudicial error justifying a protest. Labatt Food Service,
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Inc. protested the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) award of a
117
contract to provide food distributor services for military facilities.
Labatt’s final proposal revision was not considered for award because
it was submitted late and by email, a prohibited means of
118
transmission.
The solicitation required all proposal modifications
119
After
or revisions to be submitted in hard copy or via facsimile.
reviewing initial proposals, DLA sent an email to all offerors opening
discussions and requesting additional information and, despite the
solicitation’s restriction, all three offerors responded to that request
120
by email.
DLA subsequently made an award, but following a
successful GAO protest (filed by Labatt) it took corrective action and
121
Again, all three offerors submitted
solicited revised proposals.
122
revisions by email.
Labatt again protested with the GAO,
challenging a changed solicitation requirement, which spurred the
123
Although the
government to request revised proposals.
government specifically requested that the final round of proposal
revisions be submitted in hard copy via Federal Express by a 2:00 p.m.
deadline, Labatt submitted its revision by email more than two hours
124
late.
The other two offerors timely submitted their revisions via
125
Federal Express. Labatt’s proposal revision was not considered for
126
award because it had been untimely submitted via email.
The COFC granted Labatt’s request for permanent injunctive
relief, finding that the DLA had previously relied upon email
transmissions in violation of the terms of the solicitation, and that by
deviating from the solicitation’s scheme the agency had “violate[d]
127
the fundamental fairness of the procurement process.” The COFC
acknowledged that Labatt’s late submission would typically render its
proposal unawardable and preclude Labatt from establishing
128
standing.
The court, however, relied on the Federal Circuit’s
129
decision in Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States
117. Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
118. Id. at 1378.
119. Id. at 1377.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1377–78.
122. Id. at 1378.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 50, 60, 66 (2008), rev’d,
577 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
128. Id. at 62.
129. 238 F.3d 1324, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting injunctive relief because
the Government made an arbitrary and capricious responsibility determination
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to conclude that the DLA’s earlier use of email transmissions meant
that the entire competition was “fatally flawed” and should be
“rebid,” at which time the court determined that Labatt would have a
130
substantial chance of winning the competition.
On appeal,
the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision and concluded that
the protester lacked standing because it failed to demonstrate any
131
prejudicial error and submitted a late proposal revision. The COFC
found that “because the three offerors improperly submitted the first
round proposal revisions via e-mail, all proposals had been effectively
withdrawn at that time and therefore eliminated from the
132
competition.” The Federal Circuit disagreed with this rationale and
the COFC’s reliance on Garufi: “The critical difference between
Garufi and the present case is not the existence of error on the part
of the government, but the allegation of an error that, taken as true,
would be prejudicial to the complaining party’s attempt to procure
133
the contract.”
The court stressed that the existence of errors or
mistakes in the procurement process, alone, does not “nullify the
contest” and require that the procuring agency “begin anew” for the
134
protester.
Instead, the error must result in some form of
135
particularized prejudice in order to establish standing.
Furthermore, the court warned that a party’s economic interest in
the procurement or the potential to win a contract in a new
competition—the hallmarks of “interested party” status—is separate
from any assessment of whether a party has standing:
Here, however, there is no showing of how the government’s error
caused Labatt to suffer disparate treatment or particularized harm.
Instead, Labatt tautologically argues that it was harmed by the
method of transmission error because it would have a substantial
chance of receiving the contract award in a rebid. By conflating
the standing requirements of prejudicial error and economic
interest, Labatt would create a rule that, to an unsuccessful but
economically interested offeror in a bid protest, any error is
harmful. Under this radical formulation there would be no such
thing as an error non-prejudicial to an economically interested
offeror in a bid contest. We decline to adopt such a rule. Instead,
we reiterate the established law in this circuit that non-prejudicial
regarding the winning bidder’s record of integrity and business ethics), rev’d,
531 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
130. Labatt, 84 Fed. Cl. at 61–62.
131. Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1380–81.
132. Id. at 1379.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1380.
135. Id.
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errors in a bid process do not automatically invalidate a
136
procurement.

Here, the Federal Circuit concluded that Labatt had failed to show
that the government’s improper acceptance of emails interfered with
Labatt’s ability to win the contract award because there was no
connection between Labatt’s late filing and the error in the
137
government’s method of transmission. Labatt’s late submission, on
138
the other hand, disqualified it from the competition. Referring to
what is commonly called the “late is late rule,” the court noted that,
in order to avoid the potential for abuse, “submission deadlines are
139
strictly enforced across the board.”
Labatt’s late proposal revision
was “tantamount to no proposal at all,” and therefore Labatt could
not demonstrate that it had a “substantial chance” of award and had
140
“no more standing to sue than the proverbial man on the street.”
141

E. Tyler Construction Group v. United States

Tyler Construction Group filed a pre-award protest in the COFC
challenging the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ use of a
multiple award, IDIQ contract for design and construction of various
142
types of military facilities in the Southeastern United States.
Tyler complained that the Corps was not permitted to use an IDIQ
contract to procure construction services and that the bundled
procurement overstated the agency’s requirements and violated the
143
Small Business Act. The COFC granted the Government’s motion
for judgment on the administrative record, and the Federal Circuit
144
The Federal Circuit’s decision was
affirmed that decision.
consistent with others in which broad discretion is afforded to agency
officials to shape the nature and scope of a procurement to best meet
the Government’s requirements, so long as the procurement
procedures do not violate a statute or regulation and there is an
145
adequate justification for the agency’s action.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1380–81.
138. Id. at 1381.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 570 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
142. Tyler Const. Group v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 94, 95 (2008), aff’d, 570 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
143. Id. at 96.
144. Tyler Constr., 570 F.3d 1329, 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
145. See id. at 1334 (noting decisions in E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d
445, 449 (Fed. Cir. 1996), and Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bentsen, 4 F.3d 955,
958 (Fed. Cir. 1993), both of which recognize the advantages of allowing federal
procurement entities broad discretion in procurement procedures).
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The FAR provisions in subpart 16.5 that address IDIQ contracts
state that IDIQ vehicles “may be used to acquire supplies and/or
services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future
146
deliveries are not known at the time of contract award.”
IDIQ
contracts may be appropriate “when the Government cannot
predetermine, above a specified minimum, the precise quantities of
supplies or services that the Government will require during the
147
contract period.”
Tyler argued on appeal that the FAR does not permit an IDIQ
contract vehicle to be used for large-scale building construction
services because “services,” as used in FAR subpart 16.5, does not
148
specifically include “construction” services.
Tyler noted that other
provisions in the FAR refer to “services,” followed immediately by the
reference “(including construction),” but that the omission of the
“(including construction)” reference in FAR subpart 16.5 meant that
construction services were not intended to be procured using an
149
IDIQ contract. The court disagreed with this construction, noting
that other references to services in the FAR are sometimes
150
accompanied by an opposite “(excluding construction)” exception.
Instead, the court noted that “the proper inquiry is not whether the
FAR authorizes the use of IDIQ contracts for a procurement of
construction, but whether there is any statutory or regulatory
151
provision that precludes such use.”
Here, the court agreed with the COFC “that the Corps’ use of IDIQ
contracts to effect this procurement of military housing ‘represents
the sort of innovation envisioned by [FAR 1.102] and, with its
identification of both a contract dollar value and a general scope of
work, constitutes a permissible exercise of IDIQ contracting
152
authority.’”
The court noted that the Corps had undertaken a
thorough pre-solicitation research effort and that it reasonably
determined that the use of IDIQ contracts “was the most appropriate

146. Tyler Constr., 570 F.3d at 1332 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 16.501-2(a) (2009)).
147. Id. at 1332–33 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 16.504(b) (2009)).
148. Id. at 1331.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1333.
151. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 1.102(d) (2009)) (“In exercising initiative, Government
members of the Acquisition Team may assume if a specific strategy, practice, policy
or procedure is in the best interests of the Government and is not addressed in the
FAR nor prohibited by law (statute or case law), Executive order or other regulation,
that the strategy, practice, policy or procedure is a permissible exercise of
authority.”).
152. Id. (quoting Tyler Constr. Group v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 94, 99 (2008)).
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method of proceeding and therefore best served the interests of the
153
United States.”
Tyler also argued that the Corps “violated statutory and regulatory
provisions designed to aid and protect small businesses,” pointing
154
primarily to the anti-bundling provisions of the Small Business Act.
Tyler complained that the Corps’ combination of multiple
construction efforts under the single umbrella contract resulted in a
procurement whose dollar amount was beyond the financial capacity
of small business firms that could have competed for individual
155
construction efforts of a smaller size.
The Federal Circuit
disagreed, noting that the Small Business Act “does not prohibit all
bundling of contract requirements, but only ‘unnecessary and
156
unjustified bundling.’”
The court held that the Corps reasonably
concluded that “successfully meeting the Army’s goals in construction
costs and time would require a departure from the Corps’ traditional
‘one project at a time’ approach in favor of an acquisition strategy
157
that maximized economies of scale.”
On that record, the court
concluded that the Corps’ selection of the IDIQ vehicle was
158
reasonable and did not constitute an unnecessary bundling.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the Corps had included
small business subcontracting requirements in its acquisition strategy
to ensure that opportunities would be available for small business
construction companies, and therefore “endeavored, as far as
practicable, to comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements
and policies for small business participation in government
159
procurement.”
F.

160

Centech Group, Inc. v. United States

The Centech Group, Inc. was previously awarded a small business
set-aside contract by the Air Force to perform advisory services, but
during a GAO protest the Air Force learned that Centech failed to
comply with the solicitation’s Limitation on Subcontracting (LOS)
161
clause.
When the Air Force undertook corrective action, Centech
filed a bid protest in the COFC claiming that the Air Force’s
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1334.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 631(j)(3) (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 1335 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 631(j)(3) (1997)).
Id. (quoting Tyler Constr., 83 Fed. Cl. at 103 (2008)).
Id. at 1336.
Id.
554 F.3d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1031–35.
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162

corrective action was improper.
The COFC denied Centech’s
163
request for injunctive relief, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the
164
decision.
The primary issue in the protest involved the proper interpretation
and application of the LOS clause at FAR 52.219-14, implemented
165
pursuant to the Small Business Act.
Under the LOS clause,
an offeror must agree that at least fifty percent of its personnel costs
under the contract will be based upon work of the small business
166
prime contractor’s own employees.
The solicitation incorporated
the LOS clause by reference, but the Air Force informed offerors that
it would interpret the LOS clause in accordance with an Air Force
Policy Memorandum that stated:
[W]ithin [Air Force Material Command], we interpret the clause at
52.219-14 to mean that the minimum amounts of work can be
performed by the collective efforts of either small business
members of a formal joint venture or a small business prime
contractor together with the first tier small business
167
subcontractor(s) . . . .

Essentially, the memo stated that the Air Force interpreted the LOS
clause to mean that a small business prime contractor could
aggregate the small business costs between itself and its first-tier small
168
business subcontractors to satisfy the LOS requirement.
Centech relied on this Policy Memorandum and proposed to incur
43.2 percent of the total cost of the contract using its own employees,
and to combine those efforts with other small business subcontractors
169
to exceed the fifty percent LOS requirement.
Following award to
Centech, another offeror, Tybrin, protested at GAO and argued that
170
Centech’s proposal failed to comply with the LOS requirements.
GAO sought the views of the Small Business Administration (SBA),
and the SBA took the position that, in accordance with 15 U.S.C.
§ 644(o)(1)(A) and SBA regulation 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(a)(1), “a small
business receiving a set-aside contract must agree to meet by itself the
requirements of the LOS clause,” thus invalidating the Air Force’s

162. Id. at 1035–36.
163. Centech Group, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 562, 577 (2007), aff’d,
554 F.3d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
164. Centech, 554 F.3d at 1040.
165. Id. at 1031.
166. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-14 (2008)).
167. Id. at 1032.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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171

Policy Memorandum.
The Air Force subsequently rescinded its
Policy Memorandum and elected to take corrective action to
reconsider whether Centech met the LOS requirements, and GAO
172
dismissed the protest as moot.
Centech later notified the
contracting officer by mail that, although its initial proposal was
consistent with the Policy Memorandum and stated that Centech’s
own employees would only account for 43.5% of the effort, Centech
had already performed more than 51% of the work, itself, and would
continue to do so; Centech submitted revised cost models to reflect
173
that prospective change.
Nevertheless, the contracting officer
determined that Centech’s proposal, on its face, failed to comply with
the LOS requirement, rendering Centech ineligible for contract
174
award.
Centech appealed that decision, contending that the
contracting officer was required to consider Centech’s additional
information regarding its ability to self-perform more than 51% of
175
the contract work. The Air Force referred the matter of Centech’s
“responsibility” to the SBA, and Centech subsequently provided
additional documentation to the SBA, including narratives,
a compliance matrix, and spreadsheets that showed Centech had
changed its previously proposed mix of prime and subcontractor
176
Based on this additional information, the SBA
labor costs.
informed the contracting officer that the SBA concluded Centech
would comply with the LOS clause and that the SBA found Centech to
177
be responsible.
Based on the SBA’s conclusions, the Air Force reinstated the
contract award to Centech, prompting another protest from Tybrin
claiming that the Air Force should have found Centech’s proposal
178
unacceptable based on its failure to comply with the LOS clause.
179
Although GAO noted that the
GAO sustained Tybrin’s protest.
issue of small business “responsibility” is generally a matter for the
SBA, where a proposal on its face leads an agency to conclude that an
offeror has not agreed to comply with the LOS clause, the matter is

171. Id. at 1033 (citing 15 U.S.C § 644(o)(1)(A) (2006) and 13 C.F.R.
§ 125.6(a)(1) (2009)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1033–34.
177. Id. at 1034.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Tybrin Corp., Comp. Gen. B-298364.6, Mar. 13, 2007, 2007 CPD
51.
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one of the proposal’s “acceptability,” not one of “responsibility.”
Based on the Air Force’s conclusion that Centech did not comply
with the LOS, GAO concluded that the Air Force should have found
Centech’s proposal to be unacceptable for award and recommended
that the Air Force reopen discussions and solicit revised proposals,
181
which it did.
Centech protested the Air Force’s corrective action to the COFC,
seeking reinstatement of its award and declaratory relief that the
Air Force’s decision to follow GAO’s recommendation for corrective
182
action was arbitrary and capricious. Centech argued that the issue
of LOS compliance was not one of “acceptability” that should have
been evaluated as a condition of award, but instead whether
Centech’s performance actually complied with the LOS contract
clause should have been examined as a matter of post-award contract
183
The COFC declined Centech’s request for relief,
administration.
noting that Centech’s proposal, on its face, did not comply with
184
15 U.S.C. § 644(o). The COFC also concluded that the LOS clause
was a material solicitation requirement, and Centech’s failure to
185
comply with that term rendered its proposal unacceptable.
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that a “subcontracting
limitation, including the LOS clause, is a material RFP term and a
condition of a solicitation to which the offeror must agree in its
186
proposal.”
The court determined that compliance is material
“because the mix of prime-subcontractor labor affects cost
187
evaluation.”
Centech argued that even if the LOS was a material
requirement, its proposal was not facially non-compliant with the
LOS because Centech only proposed to self-perform less than 50% of
the effort based on its reliance on the Air Force’s Policy
188
Memorandum. The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by that tack,
because even if Centech had relied on the Policy Memorandum,
“[t]he Air Force Material Command could not, through the Policy

180. Centech Group, Inc., 554 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Tybrin Corp., Comp. Gen.
B-298364.6, at 5).
181. Id. at 1035 (quoting Tybrin Corp., Comp. Gen. B-298364.6, at 7).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1036.
184. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(o) (2006)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1038.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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Memorandum, alter the requirements of the LOS clause, which was
189
mandated by statute and regulation.”
The court recognized that acquisition regulations state that when a
contracting officer determines that a small business cannot meet the
LOS requirements, that finding “shall be treated as an element of
responsibility and shall be subject to the [SBA’s Certificate of
190
Competency] process.”
However, the court found that those
regulations did not apply here because Centech’s acceptability did
not turn on whether it could comply with the LOS (which would have
been an issue for the SBA), but rather whether its proposal stated
191
that it would comply with the LOS.
The court concluded that the
latter issue was properly within the contracting officer’s discretion,
and that it was clear from the face of Centech’s proposal that it had
192
not proposed to meet the 50% requirement.
193

G. Tip Top Construction, Inc. v. United States

Tip Top Construction, Inc. protested the intended award of a
contract by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under an
invitation for bids to construct a traffic circle and related work on the
194
island of St. John in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Tip Top argued that
the contracting officer improperly rejected its low-priced bid on the
ground that the bid was not accompanied by a satisfactory bid
195
bond.
Following notification that its bid had been rejected,
196
Tip Top
Tip Top filed a protest at the GAO, which was denied.
subsequently filed a complaint in the COFC seeking to enjoin the
197
contract award.
The court granted the Government’s motion for
judgment on the administrative record and subsequently denied
Tip Top’s request for reconsideration, concluding that the
contracting officer had reasonably determined that Tip Top’s bid
198
On appeal, the
bond did not comply with FAR requirements.
Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s decision and agreed that the

189. Id. at 1039 (citing United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392–93
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).
190. Id. at 1039–40 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 19.601(d) (2009) and 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(f)
(2009)).
191. Id. at 1040.
192. Id.
193. 563 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
194. Id. at 1339–41.
195. Id. at 1339, 1341.
196. Tip Top Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-311305, May 2, 2008, 2008 CPD 91.
197. Tip Top Constr., Inc. v. United States, No. 08-352C, 2008 WL 4210463, at
*2–3, (Fed. Cl. Sept. 12, 2008).
198. Id. at *1.
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contracting officer reasonably determined that Tip Top failed to
199
pledge an acceptable asset for its bid bond. At its heart, the Federal
Circuit’s decision reaffirmed the contracting officer’s ability to
exercise discretion in the procurement process in cases where the
acquisition regulations delegate subjective decisions to the
contracting officer, so long as the basis for that discretion is
200
rational.
The solicitation included the clause at FAR 52.228-1 and required
that all bids be accompanied by a bid guarantee of at least twenty
201
percent of the bid price or $3 million, whichever was less.
Accordingly, Tip Top’s bid was accompanied by a bid bond provided
by a personal surety, which consisted of the surety’s pledge of an
“allocated portion of $191,350,000.00 of previously mined, extracted,
stockpiled and marketable coal, located on the property of E.C.
202
The contracting
Scarborough [i.e., the surety]” in West Virginia.
officer rejected Tip Top’s bid because its bid bond did not meet the
requirements of FAR 28.203:
Individual Surety Bonds must be supported by acceptable assets, as
listed in the FAR. Acceptable assets include cash, United Sates
Government securities, stocks and bonds that are actively traded,
real property owned in fee simple, and irrevocable letters of credit.
Speculative assets—which would include marketable coal—are
203
specifically excluded by [FAR] 28.203-2(c)(7).

Tip Top’s president subsequently emailed the contracting officer
declaring that its surety had “other marketable assets including cash,”
and then phoned the contracting officer and verbally offered to have
204
the surety substitute a different asset. The contracting officer told
Tip Top that “the FARs would not allow for a substitute asset by the
205
individual surety and that she would not accept it.”
Tip Top’s
surety then contacted the contracting officer and offered to provide
additional documentation as to the quality and market price of the
pledged coal, contending that other federal agencies had previously
206
accepted the coal as a pledged asset.
Notwithstanding that offer,
which the contracting officer determined to be untimely, the
contracting officer determined that Tip Top had failed to provide an

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Tip Top Constr., 563 F.3d at 1339, 1343.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
Id. at 1339–40.
Id. at 1340 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(c)(7) (2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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acceptable individual surety in support of its bid guarantee and
rejected Tip Top’s bid as nonresponsible under FAR 28.203(c).
The contracting officer concluded that “the asset listed in this
instance—mined but not marketed coal—is closer in similarity to a
corporate asset, speculative asset, or accounts receivable,” which are
207
listed as unacceptable assets under the FAR.
In response to Tip Top’s protest at the GAO, the contracting
officer stated that she had “concluded coal was a speculative asset
because its actual value could not be ascertained until it was sold, its
price could fluctuate depending on its quality and market conditions,
208
and it would be a difficult asset . . . to liquidate.” In an attempt to
clarify the coal’s value, Tip Top submitted a document that showed
the proffered coal was actually “coal refuse” that would need to be
209
reprocessed before any sale.
The GAO denied Tip Top’s protest,
and the COFC “determined that it was permissible for the FHWA to
reject the bid bond without granting Tip Top’s request for a
210
substitution of assets.”
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Tip Top argued that the
contracting officer: (1) “incorrectly concluded that the pledged coal
was not an acceptable asset under the FAR . . .”; (2) “was required to
provide the surety an opportunity to support the pledged asset or
submit a substitute asset;” and (3) “erred in rejecting Tip Top’s offer
211
to provide a substitute asset.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the contracting officer’s
application of FAR 28.203-2(a) and her determination that the
pledged coal was not the type of asset that is acceptable under the
212
FAR as a bid bond asset. The court noted that “the FAR defines the
types of acceptable bid bond assets as those that have an identifiable
value and are readily marketable, so that they can easily be sold to
cover any expenses incurred by the government as a result of the
213
bidder’s failure to satisfy its obligation.”
The primary emphasized
difference between acceptable and unacceptable pledged assets lies
214
In light of this
in the asset’s discernible value and liquidity.
emphasis, the court did not believe that the mined coal met this
standard because it “is clearly less liquid than cash, stocks, certificates
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 1340–41, 1345.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1343–44.
Id. at 1343 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 48,978 (Nov. 28, 1989)).
Id.
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of deposit, and bonds.”
Although Tip Top argued that a coal
market exists, ensuring liquidity, the court noted that “the fact that
there is some market for a product does not mean that the product is
216
readily marketable.”
The court noted that the value and
marketability of coal is inherently dependent on product quality,
217
transportation and processing costs, and market volatility.
“Consequently, pledges of assets such as mined coal place a greater
burden on the contracting officer and present a greater risk of loss to
the government,” and thus, the contracting officer properly rejected
218
the pledged coal asset as a sufficient bid bond.
Tip Top also argued that the contracting officer should have
permitted the surety to provide additional information regarding the
value and nature of the coal, which the contracting officer rejected as
219
“untimely.”
The court concluded that such an error would be
non-prejudicial because the contracting officer later stated that
“even if an independent proof of value and ownership had been
provided, the asset would still be so speculative as to be unacceptable
220
because of the liquidity issue.”
Finally, Tip Top argued that the contracting officer improperly
221
refused to accept an offer for a substitute asset.
Pursuant to FAR
28.203-4, an individual surety may offer a substitute asset by
222
submitting a written request to the contracting officer.
Tip Top
noted that its president had sent an email to the contracting officer
stating that “[t]he bid bond entity has other marketable assets
including cash,” and that in a subsequent phone call he verbally
informed the contracting officer that “the surety was willing to
provide a substitute asset or cash in support of the bid bond [Tip
223
Top] provided.”
In response, the contracting officer reportedly
told Tip Top that the FAR prohibited her from considering a pledge
224
As a “threshold matter,” the court noted that
of substitute assets.
“it is clear that a contracting officer is permitted to agree to a
225
substitution of assets but is not obligated to do so.”
Here, the
contracting officer was not prohibited from considering a proper
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1343–44.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id. at 1345–46.
Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing C.F.R. § 28.203-4 (2008)).
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request, but the court concluded that the contracting officer’s belief
to the contrary was not a prejudicial error, since Tip Top had not
226
Instead,
made a proper, formal request to substitute assets.
Tip Top had only told the contracting officer that its surety had other
assets available without ever actually offering them in writing for
227
substitution. “Because there was no formal request by the surety to
provide a substitute asset, there was no formal rejection of an offer
for substitution, and the contracting officer’s purported
228
misunderstanding of FAR 28.203-4 is irrelevant.”
II. FRAUD
229

A. Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co. v. United States

The Federal Circuit in 2009 issued its much anticipated opinion in
Daewoo Engineering and Construction Co. v. United States, which involved
one of the largest judgments ever reported under the anti-fraud
230
provision of the CDA. The decision in Daewoo is important not only
for the size of the judgment, but also because the factual basis for the
judgment amount remains unclear. Although Daewoo involves
egregious conduct that any responsible contractor would know not to
repeat, the line drawn between the amount of Daewoo’s claim that
was fraudulent and the amount that was not fraudulent continues to
raise more questions than it answers.
Daewoo involved a contract with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
231
construct a road in the Republic of Palau. Daewoo maintained that
the Government was liable for delays and additional costs associated
with Daewoo’s inability to compact soil to the density required by the
232
contract to construct the road. Daewoo submitted a certified claim
233
under the CDA that asserted two principal theories of entitlement.
226. Id.
227. See id. (concluding that the e-mail “merely referred somewhat obliquely” to
the existence of other assets and finding that the telephone call was not a valid
request).
228. Id.
229. 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Daewoo II).
230. 41 U.S.C. § 604 (2006).
231. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334.
232. Id.; Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547,
561–68 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing Daewoo’s arguments
relying on weather-related claims and defective design). The principal technical
requirement in the contract was the construction of embankments to support the
road. Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 551. This task required the successive compaction of
layers of soil to a certain density. Id. Because of the moist soil, humid weather, and
amount of rainfall in Palau, however, Daewoo experienced problems in achieving
the required density. Id.; Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334.
233. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334.
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First, the contract included a Weather Clause in order to determine
Daewoo’s entitlement to delay for unusually severe weather, which set
234
the baseline against which actual weather would be measured.
Daewoo argued that the baseline misrepresented the number of days
235
out of the year that it would not be able to work due to rainfall.
Second, Daewoo argued that the compaction specification was
defective and that performance of that specification was
236
impracticable.
Daewoo sought a contract extension of 928 days, as well as $13.3
million in costs that allegedly had been incurred as of December
237
2001.
The claim also identified $50.6 million as an “estimate[] of
future cost . . . anticipated to be incurred,” which was “provided as a
guide to the Government for considering alternate specifications”—
i.e., if the Government did not permit use of an alternative
238
embankment construction method.
Daewoo’s calculation of its
claim is important to understand because this calculation became the
basis for the judgment against Daewoo.
Essentially, Daewoo
determined that, absent further relaxation of the Contract’s
embankment specification, the contract would require an additional
239
928 days to complete.
Daewoo’s claim estimated that it had
experienced 153 days of delay, and that the remaining 775 days of
240
delay would occur in the future.
Daewoo calculated an average
monthly cost based on the last three months of 2001, and then
applied that monthly average to the projected additional 25.5 months
241
(775 days), thus reaching a $50.6 million estimate of future cost.
The Government counterclaimed, alleging violations of the False
242
243
Claims Act and section 604 of the CDA, common law fraud in the
234. Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 561 n.22 (describing the Weather Clause, which
provided that time extensions would only be allowed for weather-related delays if
weather is “unusually severe” and not included in a schedule of monthly anticipated
adverse weather delay days).
235. Id. at 561–63. Daewoo’s specific argument was that the engineer used an
arbitrary rainfall amount to denote a severe weather delay and that anticipated delay
days did not include “dry-out” days. Id. at 562. Essentially, Daewoo’s argument was
that the engineer that prepared the Weather Clause only considered weather factors
that could impede all construction activity, but not factors such as humidity that
would only impede soil compaction. Id. Daewoo also argued that the Government
knew that the baseline was inaccurate but failed to disclose that superior knowledge
to Daewoo. Id. at 563–64.
236. Id. at 560, 566, 568.
237. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334, 1338 n.6; Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 560 n.19.
238. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1336–37.
239. Id. at 1338 n.6.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
243. 41 U.S.C. § 604 (2006).
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inducement, and also seeking forfeiture of Daewoo’s claims pursuant
244
to 28 U.S.C. § 2514. The COFC rejected both of Daewoo’s theories
of entitlement and found in favor of the Government on each of its
245
counterclaims.
The court held that there was no defect in the
weather clause and that this clause did not “create an implied
246
warranty of future weather.” The weather experienced by Daewoo
was largely to be expected in Palau, and, in any event, the court
found that Daewoo did not rely on the contract’s weather clause but
247
instead conducted its own analysis.
With respect to the alleged
defective soil specification, the court concluded that the density
requirement was a performance specification, not a design
specification, and therefore carried no implied warranty as to its
248
achievability.
Moreover, the court found that the contract’s
required density was not impossible, that Daewoo itself had achieved
the required density in tests, and that Daewoo failed to employ
known methods and management decisions that could have achieved
249
that required density in the field.
With respect to the Government’s counterclaims, the court held
Daewoo liable for violations of the False Claims Act and the anti-fraud
250
provision of the CDA.
False Claims Act liability was based on a
number of factors, and the COFC recited a laundry list of
inaccuracies and misrepresentations:
Daewoo used a baseline
productivity rate that was thirty-three percent higher than its original
251
bid rate in calculating its loss of productivity; the claim included

244. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334; Daewoo Eng’g & Construction Co. v. United
States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 581–88 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2009). Notably, the Government sought leave to assert these counterclaims after
Daewoo presented its case in chief during trial. Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 581–82. The
court allowed the amendment, finding that “[t]he evidence of fraud arose from and
during the testimony of plaintiff’s own witnesses, during its case-in-chief.” Id. at 582.
245. Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 597.
246. Id. at 563.
247. Id. at 558, 561, 563–64.
248. Id. at 566–68.
249. Id. at 568.
250. Id. at 584–85. The Government also had counterclaims under the Forfeiture
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2514, and for fraud in the inducement. Id. at 584, 586. For the
same reasons that the Court found liability under the False Claims Act and the CDA,
the Court determined that Daewoo had practiced fraud within the meaning of the
Forfeiture statute. Id. at 584. However, this counterclaim was inapplicable because
Daewoo’s claims were rejected—there was nothing for Daewoo to forfeit. Id.
The COFC also ruled in favor of the Government on its fraud in the inducement
counterclaim, finding that Daewoo had made several misrepresentations during the
procurement of the contract. Id. at 586–88. As with the False Claims Act
counterclaim, the Court was unable to assign actual damages to the Government’s
fraud in the inducement counterclaim. Id. at 588.
251. Id. at 578, 592.
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252

costs for certain items of equipment twice; the claim included costs
that the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) had found
253
unallowable in earlier claims; and the claim included scrapped
254
equipment or equipment depreciated beyond its acquisition cost.
Moreover, Daewoo relied on published sample average equipment
255
In rejecting
ownership and expense rates instead of actual rates.
Daewoo’s argument that the above-referenced matters were “honest
mistakes,” the COFC stated that “all Daewoo’s ‘errors’ in the claim
increased the amount of the claim; no errors had the effect of
256
reducing the claim.” Ultimately, however, the COFC was unable to
determine that the Government had suffered actual damages, and
therefore assessed only one $10,000 penalty against Daewoo under
257
the False Claim Act.
The COFC’s inability to quantify the Government’s actual damages
did not limit Daewoo’s liability under section 604 of the CDA, which
provides:
If a contractor is unable to support any part of his claim and it is
determined that such inability is attributable to misrepresentation
of fact or fraud on the part of the contractor, he shall be liable to
the Government for an amount equal to such unsupported part of
258
the claim . . . .

By its terms, a contractor’s liability under section 604 is measured by
the amount of the claim that is “unsupported” because of fraud,
rather than the amount of any actual damages sustained by the
259
Government.
Daewoo’s liability under the CDA was based largely on its finding
that Daewoo’s certified claim was a negotiating ploy:
252. Id. at 583, 592 n.79.
253. Id. at 593.
254. Id. at 592.
255. Id. at 591–92.
256. Id. at 593. The COFC’s findings were driven by the court’s conclusion that
Daewoo’s witnesses lacked credibility: “Nothing about the case was so disturbing as
the performance of plaintiff’s witnesses, however, particularly with regard to
credibility.” Id. at 569. The COFC also found that “Daewoo damaged its case by
obvious efforts to coach and lead the witnesses.” Id. at 561. Most disturbing to the
COFC was the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witnesses from Exponent.
The Government’s certified fraud examiner “testified that Exponent’s behavior in
this case was at best ‘professionally irresponsible.’ Certainly, their testimony during
trial and in plaintiff’s rebuttal case did nothing to dispel that appraisal for the court.”
Id. at 572.
257. Id. at 585, 597.
258. 41 U.S.C. § 604 (2006); see also id. § 601(9) (“‘[M]isrepresentation of fact’
means a false statement of substantive fact, or any conduct which leads to a belief of a
substantive fact material to proper understanding of the matter in hand, made with
intent to deceive or mislead.”).
259. See Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 584–85.
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The Government proved by any standard that Daewoo’s $64
million claim was fraudulent. Plaintiff made the claim for purposes
other than a good faith belief that the Government owed Daewoo
that amount. Plaintiff in fact did not believe that the Government
260
owed it $64 million as a matter of right.

The COFC found that the $50.6 million future cost estimate was
included simply to indicate “the seriousness of the situation” and to
convince the Government to allow Daewoo to use a different method
261
of constructing the embankments. Because the claim was nothing
more than a negotiating ploy, the COFC found it was evidence of
fraudulent intent and that the claim was submitted “for a reason
other than an attempt to recover money for which Daewoo believed
262
the Government is liable,” in violation of the CDA.
Although suspecting that the entire claim was fraudulent, the
COFC stated that “[i]t is theoretically possible that plaintiff’s $13
million claim represents an amount that it could have incurred
because of defective specifications, had such a theory been
263
applicable.”
Instead, the COFC ruled that “[t]he ‘part of [the]
claim’ that is fraudulent without question is $50,629,855.88,” i.e., the
amount identified in the claim as “to be incurred after December 31,
264
2001.”
A penalty of $50.6 million (instead of $64 million) was
265
therefore assessed against Daewoo.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Daewoo challenged every aspect
of the COFC’s ruling, including the denial of Daewoo’s claims, and
266
each of its challenges were rejected. Daewoo first argued that CDA
liability did not attach because it did not certify a “claim” for
$64 million, asserting that the $50.6 million future costs were “merely
estimates provided to encourage the government to adjust the
267
contract specifications.”
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that
Daewoo’s claim was “unclear” as to whether it sought the entire
268
Because of that ambiguity,
$64 million as a matter of right.
however, the Court determined that the question was a factual one,
to be resolved the same way that an ambiguity in a contract is

260. Id. at 585.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 584–85; see also id. at 570, 590, 597.
263. Id. at 596.
264. Id. at 595.
265. Id. at 597.
266. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo II), 557 F.3d 1332, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
267. Id. at 1336.
268. Id. at 1337.
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resolved—by resorting to extrinsic evidence.
The Federal Circuit
deferred to Judge Hodges’s factual finding that Daewoo submitted a
$64 million claim, observing that that finding was supported by
270
Daewoo’s complaint and by testimony of Daewoo’s own witnesses.
Daewoo next argued that, even if it had certified a $64 million
claim, the $50.6 million figure did not reflect any amount that was
271
“unsupported” because of the fraud.
As noted above, the COFC
stated that it “suspect[ed] that Daewoo’s entire claim [was]
fraudulent,” but conceded that that “[i]t is theoretically possible” that
the $13 million in costs allegedly incurred prior to December 31,
2001, was legitimate, had the defective specification argument been
272
Daewoo thus argued that, assuming there was a nonvalid.
fraudulent (even if unproved) claim for costs incurred before
December 2001, there could not also have been a fraudulent claim
273
for costs to be incurred after 2001.
Because both the “incurred”
and “future” portions of the claim were based on the same legal
theories, Daewoo argued, the COFC’s ruling that all future costs were
fraudulently claimed was inconsistent with that court’s holding that
274
all incurred costs were not.
The Government, by contrast, argued
that the entire claim was fraudulent and that the COFC’s lesser
judgment was “a perverse reward for the incomprehensible nature of
275
[Daewoo’s] claim.”
The Federal Circuit addressed these arguments by drawing a
distinction not readily apparent from the COFC’s opinion between
the underlying legal theories of Daewoo’s claim on one hand, and
276
the calculation of the different categories of costs on the other.
According to the Federal Circuit, “[t]he Court of Federal Claims did
not find that Daewoo’s theories of the government’s breach of the
contract . . . were fraudulent (though it ultimately found these
theories to be without merit). Rather, the Court of Federal Claims
found that Daewoo’s $50.6 million projected cost calculation was

269. Id. at 1337, 1337 n.3.
270. Id. at 1337–38.
271. Id. at 1338.
272. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547,
595–96 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
273. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. at 9–10,
Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(No. 07-5129).
274. Id. at 10.
275. Brief for Defendant-Appellee United States at 31, Daewoo Eng’g & Constr.
Co. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 07-5129).
276. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo II), 557 F.3d 1332, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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fraudulent.”
The Federal Circuit agreed that the projected cost
calculation was fraudulent because (1) Daewoo failed to consider
contractor-caused delay and improperly assumed that the
Government was responsible for each day of delay; (2) Daewoo
assumed that current daily expenditures represented costs for which
the Government was responsible; and (3) Daewoo used no outside
experts to prepare its claim, and its trial experts “treated the certified
claim computation as essentially worthless, did not utilize it, and did
278
not even bother to understand it.”
The Federal Circuit also agreed that the cost projection was a
“negotiating ploy,” but did not base its fraud determination solely on
279
that fact. The Federal Circuit accepted the COFC’s finding that the
$50.6 million future cost portion of the claim was not submitted
“in good faith” and that the amount did not “accurately reflect[] the
contract adjustment for which the Contractor believes the
Government is liable,” both of which are required by 41 U.S.C.
280
§ 605(c)(1). The Federal Circuit noted that “Congress specifically
enacted the fraud provision of the Contract Disputes Act ‘out of
concern that the submission of baseless claims contribute[s] to the
so-called horsetrading theory where an amount beyond that which
can be legitimately claimed is submitted merely as a negotiating
281
tactic.’”
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Daewoo’s argument that the
$50.6 million judgment violated the Constitution because it was
disproportionate to any actual damages sustained by the
282
Government.
The panel reasoned that a judgment need only be
proportionate to the “possible harm resulting from the conduct,”
and that “[h]ere the potential harm was Daewoo’s securing a
283
$50.6 million payment from the government.”
According to the
284
Federal Circuit, the “harm likely to result” from a fraudulent claim
is the amount that the Government would have overpaid because of
285
the fraud.

277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1339.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1340 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 20 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5254).
282. Id. at 1340.
283. Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)).
284. See id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996))
(explaining that the fraud’s low likelihood of success did not mean the penalty was
inappropriate).
285. Id.
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Although Daewoo definitively resolves the constitutional question
whether judgments under § 604 of the CDA depend on the extent to
which the Government suffers actual damages, the opinion raises
more questions than it answers. The primary questions concern the
manner in which liability was calculated. Under previous decisions,
the Government’s remedy under § 604 of the CDA was calculated by
286
adding up all the unsupported elements of the claim.
In UMC
287
Electronics Co. v. United States, for example, the contractor used
purchase order costs rather than actual invoice costs to calculate its
288
claim, knowing that its actual costs were lower. The remedy in that
case was the amount of the claim that was unsupported—the
difference between the purchase order costs and the actual invoice
289
costs.
In Daewoo, by contrast, the COFC drew an apparently arbitrary line
between the $13.3 million that Daewoo claimed as incurred costs,
290
and the $50.6 million claimed as future costs. The COFC held that
291
the latter was the unsupported part of the claim, and the Federal
292
It does not appear, however, that the
Circuit upheld this finding.
Government ever established that the specific inaccuracies and
misrepresentations in Daewoo’s claim totaled $50.6 million.
For example, although the Federal Circuit believed that Daewoo’s
calculation failed to consider contractor-caused delay, neither the
293
Federal Circuit nor the court quantified the impact of that failure.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit believed that Daewoo included costs for
294
which the Government was not responsible. The judgment against
Daewoo, however, was for all estimated future costs—not simply the
costs that the Federal Circuit or COFC believed should not have been
295
included.
Moreover, neither the Federal Circuit nor the COFC addressed
Daewoo’s subsequent efforts to support its claim at trial. Daewoo
hired a cost expert who prepared a revised quantum calculation, after
the claim’s initial submission, that resulted in a claim of $29 million

286. See 41 U.S.C. § 604 (2006).
287. 249 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
288. Id. at 1339–40.
289. Id. at 1340; UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 776, 821 (1999).
290. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 596
(2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
291. Id. at 597.
292. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo II), 557 F.3d 1332, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
293. Id. at 1338.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1339.
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rather than the $64 million originally claimed. Neither the COFC
nor the Federal Circuit, however, addressed whether that subsequent
effort “supported” some part of the $50.6 million that was otherwise
297
considered “unsupported.”
Yet another problematic aspect of the Federal Circuit’s opinion is
298
its reference to Daewoo’s claim as a “negotiating ploy.” Unlike the
COFC’s opinion, the negotiating ploy rationale is not the primary
basis for liability in the Federal Circuit’s analysis. Instead, the Federal
Circuit was primarily concerned with the manner in which the $50.6
299
million estimate of future costs was calculated.
The evidence that
Daewoo submitted the claim in order to “get the government’s
attention” and convince them to change the soil specification appears
to have been considered as evidence of Daewoo’s fraudulent intent,
rather than evidence of the underlying overstatement of the amount
300
to which Daewoo was entitled.
This distinction, however, is not explicit in the Federal Circuit’s
opinion, which could lead some to argue that the negotiating ploy
rationale provides an independent basis of liability. In other words,
Daewoo may prompt the Government to argue that a contractor
violates § 604 of the CDA every time it submits a monetary claim with
the unstated objective of obtaining some other, non-monetary relief.
That cannot be a correct application of the CDA, as the legislative
history quoted in the court’s opinion makes clear; Congress’s
concern with “horsetrading” was the situation “where an amount
beyond that which can be legitimately claimed is submitted merely as
301
a negotiating tactic.’”
The Government therefore must first show
that the contractor claimed “an amount beyond that which can be
302
legitimately claimed.” This question must be answered before
offering evidence of why this higher amount was claimed, and
whether the claim was a negotiating tactic.
Indeed, many contractors submitting a claim would prefer a
negotiated solution in which the Government stops or corrects

296. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 573,
580–81, 589–90 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
297. The COFC questioned the revised calculation and the professionalism of
Daewoo’s expert, id. at 580–81, but ultimately declined to address this issue because
the approach used by the expert was used in the certified claim presented to the
contracting officer, id. at 590–91.
298. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1340 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 20 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5254).
302. Id.
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whatever conduct the contractor complains of in the claim. Pointing
out that the Government can avoid the full estimate of future
damages claimed by altering its conduct is not necessarily an
improper “negotiating ploy”—it simply states the truism that a
breaching party can mitigate its own damages by ceasing the conduct
that constitutes the breach. As a result, if the claim amount
is legitimately calculated, the fact that the contractor prefers
non-monetary relief should be irrelevant. Unfortunately, the Federal
Circuit’s opinion was less than clear on this point, which may lead to
allegations of fraud resting entirely on the negotiating ploy rationale.
III. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE DISPUTES
A. Jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit issued two precedential opinions concerning
the jurisdiction of the Boards and the COFC to hear contract
303
304
disputes under the CDA.
In Winter v. FloorPro, Inc., the court
continued its practice of strictly construing jurisdictional statutes
containing a waiver of sovereign immunity, holding that the ASBCA
does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the CDA by a
305
third party beneficiary to a government contract. By contrast, in a
matter of first impression, the Federal Circuit ruled in Arctic Slope
306
Native Ass’n v. Sebelius that the six-year jurisdictional limitations
307
period for CDA claims was subject to equitable tolling.
Winter v. FloorPro, Inc.
The claimant in Winter v. FloorPro was a subcontractor to G.M. & W.
Construction Corp. (“GM & W”), a minority-owned business
qualifying under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, to install
308
FloorPro
floor coating at warehouse bays on a military base.
completed the contract work and submitted an invoice to GM & W
309
but did not receive payment.
The Government then agreed to
modify the contract “to specify that the government would issue a
1.

303. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over contract disputes to the
Boards of Contract Appeals); id. § 609(a) (granting jurisdiction over contract
disputes to the COFC); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over
non-CDA breach of contract actions to the COFC).
304. 570 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
305. Id. at 1370, 1373.
306. 583 F.3d 785 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
307. Id. at 788.
308. FloorPro, 570 F.3d at 1368.
309. Id.
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two-party check made payable to both FloorPro and GM & W.”
311
FloorPro
Nonetheless, the Government paid GM & W directly.
later filed a claim with the CO for payment based on the
Government’s failure to follow the terms of the contract
312
modification.
The CO refused to issue a decision on the claim
313
because the Government did not have a contract with FloorPro.
314
FloorPro then filed an appeal at the ASBCA.
On a motion to dismiss and later summary judgment motion, the
ASBCA found that FloorPro could bring an appeal under the CDA as
315
an intended third party beneficiary to the contract modification.
While acknowledging that FloorPro was not in privity of contract with
the Government, the ASBCA relied on D & H Distributing Co. v.
316
United States to conclude that a third party beneficiary to a
government contract could bring an appeal to the Board under the
317
CDA. The Board granted summary judgment for FloorPro for the
318
full $37,500 sought.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that the CDA applied
only to “contractors” as defined in the Act—“a party to a Government
319
contract other than the Government.”
In addition, the CDA
applies only to “express or implied contract[s] . . . entered into by an
320
executive agency.” The Federal Circuit held that the CDA did not
321
include an exception to permit appeals by third party beneficiaries.
The Federal Circuit also distinguished D & H Distributing because the
subcontractor in that case brought the claim at the COFC under the
322
Tucker Act rather than the CDA.
As such, the court in D & H
Distributing “was not interpreting or applying the CDA’s provision that
323
only ‘contractors’ may appeal to agency boards of appeals.”

310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1369.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. In re FloorPro, Inc., ASBCA No. 54143, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32571 (2004) (FloorPro I)
(denying the government’s motion to dismiss); In re FloorPro, Inc., ASBCA No.
54143, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33615 (2007) (FloorPro II), aff’d on reconsideration, In re FloorPro,
Inc., ASBCA No. 54143, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33793 (2008) (FloorPro III) (granting summary
judgment in favor of appellant).
316. 102 F.3d 542, 547–48 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a third party beneficiary
could enforce a contract provision against the Government at the COFC).
317. FloorPro I, ASBCA No. 54143, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32571.
318. FloorPro II, ASBCA No. 54143, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33615.
319. FloorPro, 570 F.3d at 1369–70 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 601(4) (2006)).
320. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a).
321. FloorPro, 570 F.3d at 1371.
322. Id. at 1372.
323. Id.
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Because FloorPro was not in privity with the Government, and
because there is no exception to the CDA’s requirement that only
“contractors” may bring an appeal under the Act, the Federal Circuit
324
held that the ASBCA did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the Board’s decision with
325
instructions to dismiss the appeal.
Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius
As noted above, Arctic Slope finally provided the Federal Circuit an
opportunity to address whether the CDA’s six-year limitations period
326
is subject to equitable tolling.
Parties to prior appeals had raised
327
the issue, but those appeals were disposed of on other grounds.
Although the case involves a unique statutory scheme and facts that
are uncommon to most CDA appeals, the Federal Circuit
nevertheless definitively resolved the question by stating that “we do
not agree that the limitations period in section 605(a) is absolute and
328
not subject to equitable tolling.”
In Arctic Slope, Indian tribes and tribal organizations brought claims
under the CDA related to contracts with the Indian Health Service
329
(IHS) to provide health care services to their tribe members.
The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) dismissed several of
the claims because they were not filed within six years of accrual as
330
required by section 605(a) of the CDA.
The CBCA held that the
CDA’s presentment restriction was a jurisdictional requirement that
331
was not subject to either equitable or legal tolling. On appeal, the
Federal Circuit found that, while the CDA’s six-year presentment
period is not subject to legal tolling as a result of class action
332
litigation, it is subject to equitable tolling.
The Federal Circuit
remanded the claims to the CBCA to determine whether they
333
satisfied the requirements for equitable tolling.
2.

324. Id. at 1372–73.
325. Id. at 1373.
326. Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius, 583 F.3d 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
327. See, e.g., Bonneville Assocs. v. Barram, 165 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that, even if equitable tolling were applicable, the contractor had not
carried its burden to invoke it); see also Int’l Air Response v. United States, 302 F.3d
1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (deciding the case on res judicata grounds and thereby
avoiding the question whether the CDA’s one-year time period to appeal final
decisions of the contracting officer to the COFC is subject to equitable tolling).
328. Arctic Slope, 583 F.3d at 800.
329. Id. at 788.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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The contracts at issue are “self-determination contracts” authorized
by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
334
Under these contracts, the tribes administer programs
(ISDA).
previously provided by the federal government and receive the same
amount of funding that the government would have appropriated for
335
the programs if it continued to operate them directly.
Among
other things, the 1988 amendments to the ISDA required the
Government to pay administrative expenses associated with the
self-determination contracts, including “contract support costs” that
the federal government would not have incurred by directly
336
providing the services.
The ISDA amendments also applied the
CDA to disputes arising under those contracts and permitted
contractors to bring claims in what is now the CBCA, the COFC,
337
or district courts. Beginning in 1999, several ISDA contractors filed
class action suits against the Government for allegedly failing to fully
338
fund contract support costs on self-determination contracts.
339
The district courts ultimately denied class certification. In 2005, the
Arctic Slope Native Association (ASNA) filed CDA claims seeking
contract support costs on its IHS contracts for fiscal years 1996
through 2000, while asserting that it was a member of the putative
340
class in one of the pending class actions.
Even though the claims
were filed outside the CDA’s six-year presentment period, the ASNA
argued that the filing period was legally tolled until the class
certification was denied or, alternatively, should be tolled for
341
equitable reasons.
The CBCA dismissed the claims for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that it did not have jurisdiction over claims that
342
were not filed within the CDA’s six-year window.
The Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s argument that the
CDA’s time limitation could not be tolled because it is
343
“jurisdictional.”
However, the plaintiffs were not eligible for class
action tolling because, even if the class had been certified, they would
not have been eligible to be class members because they failed to
344
present their CDA claims to a CO within six years of accrual.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450(n) (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 788–89.
Id. at 789.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 795–96.
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In addition, the Federal Circuit noted that applying class action
tolling in this case would have placed the plaintiffs—putative class
members—in a better position than if they had been named parties
345
in the class action litigation. As named parties, their claims would
have been dismissed for failure to comply with the CDA’s
346
Nonetheless, when it examined the
presentment requirement.
issue of equitable tolling, the Federal Circuit concluded that it was
required to apply the rebuttable presumption of Irwin v. Department of
347
Veterans Affairs that “equitable tolling applicable to suits against
private defendants should also apply to suits against the United
348
States[,]” such as those authorized by the CDA. The Federal Circuit
therefore remanded for the CBCA to determine whether the
349
limitations period should be equitably tolled. To date, neither the
COFC nor the boards of contract appeals have relied on Arctic Slope to
support equitable tolling of a CDA claim that was not presented
within six years of accrual.
B. Contract Interpretation
The Federal Circuit in 2009 continued to decide appeals involving
questions of contract interpretation according to the “plain meaning”
of the contract language at issue, and concluded in several cases that
this plain meaning had eluded the lower tribunal. The plain
meaning rule applied by the Federal Circuit can be stated as follows:
“[When] the provisions of the Agreement are phrased in clear and
unambiguous language, they must be given their plain and ordinary
meaning, and we may not resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret
350
them.”
The Federal Circuit’s application of this rule has been
criticized for departing from the common law of contracts, which
ostensibly controls absent statutory or regulatory instruction
351
otherwise. The plain meaning rule, however, continues to drive the
Federal Circuit’s analysis of contract disputes.
345. Id. at 796.
346. Id.
347. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
348. Arctic Slope, 583 F.3d at 798 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96).
349. Id. at 800.
350. Coast Fed. Bank v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(en banc).
351. See Winstar v. United States, 518 U.S. 839, 887 (1996) (referring to plain
meaning as the “unmistakability doctrine” and holding that the Federal Circuit
correctly deferred to normal contract principles when enforcing the government
contract at issue); see also Mobil Oil Exploration v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 608
(2000) (“The Restatement of Contracts reflects many of the principles of contract
law that are applicable to this action.”). See generally W. Stanfield Johnson, Interpreting
Government Contracts: Plain Meaning Precludes Extrinsic Evidence and Controls at the
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Bell BCI Co. v. United States
Perhaps the most surprising decision of the year in this regard was
Bell BCI Co. v. United States, where a divided panel of the court ruled
that boilerplate release language in a bilateral modification barred a
contractor’s claims for the cumulative and disruptive impact of
353
multiple change orders. Over a vigorous dissent, the panel majority
held that the release language unambiguously discharged claims for
cumulative impact and disruption, notwithstanding (1) the absence
of any reference to “cumulative impact” or “disruption” in the
354
modification,
(2) the Government’s failure to introduce any
355
evidence that the parties intended to release such claims, and
356
The majority held
(3) the trial court’s findings to the contrary.
these claims were barred notwithstanding the fact that the full
disruptive impact of the change orders was not known at the time the
modification was executed. Indeed, this could not have been known
given that the contractors’ claim was for the cumulative impact of
multiple change orders, many of which had not yet been issued when
357
the modification was signed.
Bell BCI involved the construction of a laboratory building at the
358
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland.
Approximately nine months into construction, NIH decided to add a
359
new floor to the building. NIH issued more than 200 contract
modifications that delayed the completion of the project by nineteen
and a half months and increased the contract price by thirty-four
360
percent.
The Government and the prime contractor negotiated
numerous modifications addressing the direct impact of many
change orders with the following release language:
“This
modification provides for full compensation for the changed work,
including both Contract cost and Contract time. The Contractor
1.

Federal Circuit, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 635 (2005) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s
application of the plain meaning rule as inconsistent with the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts).
352. 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Bell BCI II).
353. Id. at 1341.
354. See id. at 1339 (quoting the modification language).
355. Bell BCI Co. v. United States (Bell BCI I), 81 Fed. Cl. 617, 639 (2008), aff’d in
part,vacated in part, 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Bell BCI, 570 F.3d at 1344
(Newman, J., dissenting).
356. Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1344; Bell BCI I, 81 Fed. Cl. at 639–40.
357. Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1339 (noting that the Government issued 113
additional modifications to the contract incorporating 216 changes to the contract’s
scope of work, and that an additional fifty-eight changes were issued but never
incorporated into a modification).
358. Id. at 1338.
359. Id. at 1339.
360. Id. at 1339, 1342; Bell BCI I, 81 Fed. Cl. at 618–19.
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hereby releases the Government from any and all liability under the
Contract for further equitable adjustment attributable to the
361
Following contract completion, the prime
Modification.”
contractor submitted a claim for the cumulative impact of the
multiple change orders issued by the Government, which the CO
362
denied.
The COFC ruled in favor of the prime contractor, holding that the
“[Government’s] accord and satisfaction defense [was] without
363
merit.”
The COFC discussed the “clear distinction in the law”
between claims for the cost of performing changed work and claims
364
for the effect of multiple changes on unchanged work. The COFC
held that the release language did not bar the latter type of claim,
reasoning that (1) “[n]one of the contract modifications included
any payment to Bell for cumulative impact or labor inefficiency”;
(2) “Bell did not expressly release its cumulative impact claim in any
modification”; (3) “the release language does not address cumulative
impact claims”; and (4) the releases “preceded many of the events
365
giving rise to the claim.”
The COFC further observed that the
Government offered no evidence to support its assertion that the
366
parties intended to bar cumulative impact and disruption claims.
In fact, the Government declined to offer any testimony from the CO
who signed the modifications and who presumably was in the best
position to know what the Government understood the release
367
language to cover.
The COFC inferred that the CO’s testimony
368
would not have supported the Government’s position.
As discussed above, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed
the COFC, holding that the release language unambiguously covered
“any and all liability . . . attributable to” the modifications containing
369
the release language. The majority reasoned that, although “there
may be ambiguity as to which claims are ‘attributable to’ a given
modification, . . . we cannot glean any ambiguity about which types of
370
claims are released.” Accordingly, the majority held that the release
encompassed cumulative impact claims to the extent they were
“attributable to” modifications containing the release, and remanded
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1339.
Id.
Bell BCI I, 81 Fed. Cl. at 619.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 619–20, 639.
Id. at 639.
Id.
Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1341.
Id.
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the case to the COFC to “determine which of Bell’s cumulative
impact claims, if any, are ‘attributable to’ modifications other than
371
those modifications that contain the release language.”
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that “[t]his case is a compelling
illustration of why appellate tribunals should give due weight to the
attributes and benefits of the process of trial, for such processes
enable the trial judge to dig deeply into the events, to figure out what
372
happened and what was intended, and to reach a just result.”
Judge Newman disagreed with the view that the contract was
unambiguous, noting that “[a]n accord does not arise until there is a
373
dispute.”
Judge Newman concluded that the release language
“did not produce an ‘accord and satisfaction’ of unforeseen claims
374
arising from unforeseen and unintended events.”
As Judge Newman pointed out, the majority’s ruling is in tension
with the well-established rule that a general release does not operate
to extinguish claims which were not known and could not have been
375
known at the time the release was executed. Although parties to a
contract are free to release each other from liability for unknown
claims, this general rule reasonably requires specific contract
language or evidence that the parties intended such a result. In the
wake of Bell BCI, contractors must now expressly reserve their rights
to cumulative impact and disruption claims in all bilateral
modifications containing boilerplate releases, if such claims are
possible. However, given that the scope of such claims is usually
never known with any degree of certainty until later in contract
performance, insisting on such reservations will undoubtedly
complicate and delay the negotiation of timely change orders,
frustrating the very purpose of the “Changes Clause.”

371. Id. at 1342.
372. Id. at 1343 (Newman, J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 1346.
374. Id.
375. See, e.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States,
531 F.2d 1037, 1047 (Ct. Cl. 1976)) (“The rule for releases is that . . . a general
release bars claims based on events occurring prior to the date of the release”). “The
test is not the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge, but the availability of information
which, properly digested, could reasonably be expected to acquaint plaintiff with the
existence of a reimbursable cost.” Johnson, Drake, & Piper, 531 F.2d at 1048 (quoting
U.S. Rubber Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 492, 496 (Ct. Cl. 1958)). It follows
that “the critical inquiry in determining whether a release operates on a particular
claim or right is whether the claim or right can be said to exist such that a party is
capable of waiving or preserving it.” 76 C.J.S. Release § 76 (2007).
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376

LAI Services, Inc. v. Gates
In LAI Services, Inc. v. Gates, the Federal Circuit’s plain meaning
approach to contract interpretation resulted in a partial victory for
both sides. The Court held that the plain language of the contract
supported the contractor’s contention as to what contract line-item
377
number (CLIN) controlled billing and payment for certain work.
By contrast, the Court held that the same plain language supported
the Government’s argument as to how payment under that CLIN
378
would be made.
The contract at issue required LAI Services to provide material
distribution services to the Defense Distribution Depot in San Diego,
379
California (DDDC).
Under the Contract, “[LAI] was required to
receive, label, pack, store and deliver various items to meet military
380
needs both on-base and off-base.” The Contract provided separate
prices for individual CLINs corresponding to each of the tasks
381
required by the statement of work.
The dispute in LAI Services turned on which CLIN governed
payment for a particular task, known as “minimum military packing
[‘MMP’] of off-base transhipments,” and how payment would be
382
made. From its first invoice, LAI billed under CLIN 0002 for MMP
383
CLIN 0002 had a unit price of $25.34
of off-base transshipments.
and stated that billing should be “per each,” which LAI took to mean
384
it should bill on a per-item basis.
The government’s position was
that MMP transshipments should be billed under CLIN 0001 at a
385
unit price of $5.87, with billing and payment on a per-line basis.
Thus, the government denied a portion of the charges on LAI’s
386
invoice. The CO denied in its entirety LAI’s certified claim for the
difference between what it had invoiced under CLIN 0002 and what
2.

376. 573 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
377. Id. at 1314–15.
378. Id. at 1317.
379. Id. at 1308.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
“Under the contract, LAI packed both ‘mission stock’ and
‘transshipments.’” Id. “‘Mission stock’ items were items owned and stored by DDDC
itself,” whereas “‘transshipments’ referred to items sent from another organization to
DDDC, then quickly processed and sent to a second military entity.” Id. at 1308–09.
“Items could be sent to locations at DDDC, or to locations off-base.” Id. at 1309.
Further, different items had different packaging needs, and “minimum military
packing” (MMP) was the simplest form of packing designed for typical commercial
shipping environments. Id.
383. Id. at 1309.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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387

the Government had paid under CLIN 0001.
The ASBCA agreed
with the CO, concluding that the contract was patently ambiguous
and that LAI’s failure to ascertain the correct interpretation prior to
388
contract award defeated its claim.
Alternatively, the ASBCA ruled
that, even if the ambiguity were latent, LAI’s interpretation was not
reasonable, and that LAI had not established that it relied on its
389
interpretation at the time it entered into the contract.
On appeal, the Court addressed two issues: (1) whether MMP for
off-base transshipments were covered by CLIN 0001 or 0002; and
(2) if covered by CLIN 002, whether “per each” meant that payment
390
would be made on a per-item or per-package basis. With respect to
the first issue, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the Board’s view that
the contract was patently ambiguous, holding that “[t]he clear
language of the contract supports LAI’s reading of the requirements
391
of the contract with respect to CLIN 0001 and CLIN 0002.”
Construing the descriptions of each CLIN in the contract, the
Federal Circuit held that “CLIN 0001 was a catchall provision” to be
392
used “‘unless noted below’ in another CLIN number.”
Because
CLIN 0002 specifically listed statement of work Section C-5.5.1, which
dealt with MMP of off-base transshipments, the Court held that that
393
work was “noted below” and therefore excluded from CLIN 0001.
On appeal, the government argued in support of the Board’s
conclusion that construing Section C-5.5.1 to include the work at
394
issue created a conflict with another provision of the contract.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that “the plain language of
the contract compels the conclusion that billing and payment for
395
MMP of off-base transshipments was governed by CLIN 0002.”
The court reasoned that the Government’s construction of the
contract, and not LAI’s, impermissibly sought to add terms to the
396
contract that were not there.
LAI’s victory on the first issue, however, was tempered by the
Federal Circuit’s resolution of the second. Although the court

387. Id.
388. Id. at 1309–10.
389. Id. at 1310.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1316.
392. Id. at 1311.
393. Id. at 1314 (“As the plain language of Section C-5.5.1 covers MMP of off-base
transshipments, they fall within CLIN 0002, not within CLIN 0001.”).
394. Id. at 1312 (discussing the Board’s rationale); id. at 1313 (discussing the
Government’s argument).
395. Id. at 1315.
396. Id.
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agreed that the work was covered by CLIN 0002, which provided a
“fixed unit price per each,” the court ultimately held that “each”
397
meant each container, rather than each item being packed. Having
held that the payment was to be made under CLIN 0001, the Board
398
had not reached this issue; the Federal Circuit nevertheless decided
the question while noting that both parties had urged the court to do
so and that the Board had taken extensive testimony and made
399
specific factual findings related to the issue.
The court therefore
concluded that resolving the issue was “in the interest of judicial
efficiency when remand is unlikely to produce additional facts or
400
guidance.”
The Federal Circuit reasoned that, although “each” was not
defined in the contract, “reading the contract as a whole supports a
401
per-container billing structure.”
The court held that “each”
referred to the title of the CLIN, which, in the case of CLIN 0002,
402
was “PPP&M,” or “Preservation, Packaging, Packing, and Marking.”
The court’s analysis on this point is not entirely clear from the
opinion, but the court apparently accepted the Government’s
argument that “‘each’ means each PPP&M activity,” which, in turn,
403
meant each package. The court appears to have also been swayed
by the Government’s argument that paying LAI per item would result
in a windfall, particularly where a container contained many small
404
items.
Regardless, the court held that even if the contract were
ambiguous on this point, LAI would still lose because it had not
demonstrated that it relied on its interpretation when preparing its
405
bid.
Pointing to “numerous documents where LAI estimated the
number of containers needed for transshipments in a one-to-one
item-to-container ratio,” the Court found that “LAI consistently
believed the number of containers would equal the number of
transshipment items, and therefore could not have relied on an

397. Id. at 1317.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. (citing Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1311.
403. Id. at 1316.
404. Id. at 1316, 1318.
405. Id. at 1317 (quoting P.R. Burke Co. v. United States, 277 F.3d 1346, 1356 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2002)) (“In order for a contractor to recover based on an ambiguous
contract provision, the contractor must have relied on its interpretation when
preparing its bid.”).
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interpretation where it would make hundreds of thousands of dollars
406
per container.”
407

Bank of Guam v. United States
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Bank of Guam v. United States
408
turned on the “plain meaning” of a single word—“imposed.”
The question in that appeal was whether the Territory of Guam could
collect taxes imposed on earnings from U.S. Treasury bonds held by
409
the Bank of Guam (the Bank). The Bank argued that the terms of
the bonds exempted interest from taxation by Guam, including
taxation under the Guam Territorial Income Tax (GTIT)—a tax
410
enacted by the U.S. Congress but collected by Guam.
In 2002,
however, a U.S. district court held that the interest was taxable under
the GTIT, and the Bank thereafter brought suit against the U.S.
Government in the COFC to recover back-taxes it was forced to pay
411
on interest received from the bonds.
The bonds each contained a statement “that they were exempt
from all taxation now or hereafter imposed . . . by . . . any of the
412
possessions of the United States.”
The Federal Circuit, affirming
the COFC’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim, held that there
was no breach of contract because the GTIT was not “imposed” by
413
Guam. The Court appeared to ground this conclusion in the plain
meaning rule: “[I]t is quite clear that Congress, not Guam, enacted,
414
authorized, or otherwise imposed the GTIT.”
The court’s conclusion that the phrase “imposed by” clearly and
unambiguously means “enacted by” or “authorized by,” but not
“collected by,” is far from self-evident. As the Bank argued on appeal
and in its petition for rehearing, the term “imposed” has meanings
415
other than “enacted by” or “authorized by.”
For example, Black’s
416
Law Dictionary defines “impose” as meaning “[t]o levy or exact.”
3.

406. Id. at 1318.
407. 578 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
408. See id. at 1327 (discussing the use of the word “imposed” in regulations, in
express contracts, and by Congress).
409. Id. at 1320.
410. Id. at 1321, 1324.
411. Id. at 1322.
412. Id. at 1326–27. Guam is a “possession” of the United States under the
Organic Act of Guam. See Organic Act of Guam, Pub. L. No. 630, 64 Stat. 384
(codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1421 (2006)).
413. See Bank of Guam, 578 F.3d at 1328.
414. Id. at 1327.
415. See id.; Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 13–14, Bank of
Guam v. United States, No. 2008-5078 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2009) (reh’g denied
Dec. 18, 2009).
416. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the court’s opinion contains little analysis of the term
imposed, instead relying on statements made by the Bank’s counsel
417
during oral argument and two Ninth Circuit opinions finding that
418
the GTIT was “imposed” by Congress.
Having concluded that the
language was plain and unambiguous based, in part, on evidence
outside the four corners of the contract, the court refused to consider
419
parole evidence offered by the Bank.
420

Stockton East Water District v. United States
The Federal Circuit also disposed of Stockton East Water District v.
United States based on its reading of the plain meaning of the contract
421
at issue in that appeal.
The contract required the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation to release a minimum amount of water to the Stockton
422
East Water District. When the Bureau failed to release the requisite
423
amount, the Water District sued under a breach of contract theory.
The Government defended on the ground that the failure to release
the water was “beyond the control” of the Bureau within the meaning
of a contract clause that provided “if a shortage does occur during
any year because of drought, or other causes which . . . are beyond
the control of the United States, no liability shall accure [sic] against
424
the United States.”
The Government asserted that the failure to
release the water was “beyond the control” of the Bureau because it
was the result of a congressionally directed change in water
425
management policy.
The Federal Circuit found the Government’s argument
426
unpersuasive.
The Court found that the plain meaning of the
phrase “beyond the control of the United States on its face
exclude[d] anything that [was] within the control of the United
427
States.”
Under the contract provision at issue, drought,
earthquakes, or even sabotage would have excused the
4.

417. Bank of Guam, 578 F.3d at 1327.
418. Id. at 1328 (citing Gumataotao v. Dir. of Dep’t of Revenue and Taxation,
236 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001); Bank of Am., Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Chaco, 539
F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1976)).
419. See id. (quoting McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1435
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[I]f the ‘provisions are clear and unambiguous, they must be given
their plain and ordinary meaning,’ and the court may not resort to extrinsic evidence
to interpret them.” (internal citations omitted)).
420. 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
421. Id. at 1361–62.
422. Id. at 1350–51.
423. See id. at 1354.
424. Id. at 1360–61.
425. See id. at 1356, 1361.
426. See id. at 1361–62.
427. See id. at 1361.
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428

Government.
In contrast, “changes in law, or changes in
government policy, or changes in management practices brought
about by the Government’s changes in law or policy, are all causes
429
within the control of the United States.”
Thus, on this basis, the
Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s defense to the breach of
contract claim.
430

Arko Executive Services, Inc. v. United States
Arko Executive Services, Inc. v. United States appears to be the only
appeal involving a question of contract interpretation where the
Federal Circuit did not believe the language at issue had a “plain
meaning.” The court reconciled two FAR clauses that provide the
Government with the right to extend performance under a contract:
FAR § 52.217-9, “Option to Extend the Term of the Contract,” and
431
FAR 52.217-8, “Option to Extend Services.” The court held that the
former clause, which provides that “the total duration of this
contract, including the exercise of any options under this clause, shall
not exceed five years,” did not preclude the Government from
432
extending performance beyond five years under the latter clause.
The contract at issue in Arko provided for a base year and four
433
one-year options, each of which the Government exercised.
Prior
to expiration of the fourth option year on March 31, 2005,
the Government solicited proposals for a follow-on contract to begin
434
April 1, 2005. The follow-on procurement was apparently delayed,
and in March 2005, the Government notified Arko that it would
require services through April 30, 2005, pursuant to FAR § 52.217-8,
which was included in the contract and provides:

5.

The Government may require continued performance of any
services within the limits and at the rates specified in the contract. . . .
The option provision may be exercised more than once, but the
total extension of performance hereunder shall not exceed 6
435
months.

Arko objected, arguing that FAR § 52.217-9 placed an absolute,
436
five-year limit on the duration of options. That clause provides:

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 1361–62.
Id. at 1362.
553 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1377–78.
Id. at 1379–80 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.217-9(c) (2009)).
Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1378 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.217-8).
Id. at 1379.
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(a) The Government may extend the term of this contract by
written notice to the Contractor within the performance period of
the contract or within 30 days after funds for the option year
become available, whichever is later.
(b) If the Government exercises this option, the extended contract
shall be considered to include this option provision.
(c) The total duration of this contract, including the exercise of
437
any options under this clause, shall not exceed five years.

Arko argued that the only contractual provision allowing
438
continued services was FAR § 52.237-3, “Continuity of Services.”
That clause requires the contractor to provide “phase-in, phase-out
439
Unlike FAR
services for up to 90 days after this contract expires.”
§ 52.217-8, where the contractor is compensated at “the rates
specified in the contract,” FAR § 52.237-3(d) provides that “[t]he
contractor shall be reimbursed for all reasonable phase-in, phase-out
440
costs and a fee (profit).”
Arko asserted that its continued
performance caused it to incur $184,010.10 in costs above the
441
compensation provided under FAR § 52.217-8.
In reconciling these “labyrinthine” contract clauses, the court ruled
that the five-year limit in FAR § 52.217-9 did not prevent the
442
Government from extending the contract under FAR § 52.217-8.
The court relied first on the phrase “including the exercise of any
options under this clause” in FAR § 52.217-9(c), and held that
“the five-year limit includes the options discussed in the FAR
§ 52.217-9 clause . . . but does not include options to extend services,
443
such as FAR § 52.217-8, that are not under the clause.” The court
reasoned further that the purpose of FAR § 52.217-8 is to “allow[] the
government to extend services without negotiating short extensions
to existing contracts in circumstances, such as those here, where the
444
award of a successor contract is delayed.”
According to the court,
allowing the six months extension permitted by FAR 52.217-8 in
addition to the five years permitted under FAR § 52.217-9 is
445
consistent with that purpose.
437. Id. at 1378 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.217-9(a)–(c)).
438. Id. at 1377.
439. Id. at 1379 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.237-3(b)).
440. Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.237-3(d)).
441. Id. at 1377.
442. Id. at 1378, 1380–81.
443. Id. at 1379–80.
444. Id. at 1380.
445. Id. The Court reasoned that this holding was not inconsistent with FAR
17.204(a) and (e), which require that contracts “specify limits on . . . the overall
duration of the term of the contract, including any extension,” and that “the total of
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The Court regarded the facts of Arko as “exactly the situation FAR
§ 217-8 was written to address”—i.e., one in which the award of a
follow-on contract has been delayed notwithstanding the
Government’s reasonable efforts to have the follow-on contract in
446
place at the expiration of the predecessor contract.
A tougher
447
situation is presented by appeals such as In re Griffin Services, Inc.,
where the Government arguably used FAR § 52.217-8 to extend a
contract because it failed to properly exercise the contract’s options
448
in accordance with section 52.217-9.
On one hand, the court in
Arko relied first and foremost on the language of FAR § 52.217-9,
which the court suggested did not limit the Government’s rights
449
under FAR § 52.217-8 by its terms. On the other hand, the court’s
emphasis on the special purpose of FAR § 52.217-8 suggests that the
court may not tolerate the Government’s use of that clause to
accomplish another purpose altogether.
450

States Roofing Corp. v. Winter
In States Roofing Corp. v. Winter, the Federal Circuit found that a
contractor’s interpretation of a contract was within the “zone of
reasonableness” and reversed the Armed Services Board of Contract
451
Appeal’s (the Board) ruling to the contrary.
At issue was whether
States Roofing reasonably interpreted waterproofing requirements of
a roofing contract such that the Government’s conflicting
interpretation was a constructive change to the contract that merited
452
additional compensation.
6.

the basic and option periods shall not exceed 5 years in the case of services.” Id.
According to the Court:
[T]he contract still specifies limits on the ‘duration of the contract including
any extension,’ as required by FAR 17.204(e); the maximum duration
including extensions is the five years comprising the initial performance
period and four renewal options, plus up to six months of extended services
under FAR 52.217-8 and up to 90 days of phase-in, phase-out services under
FAR 52.237-3.
Id. The Court also rejected Arko’s assertion that it should be compensated under
FAR 52.237-3, holding that Arko did not provide “phase-in, phase-out services” as
contemplated in that clause. Id. at 1381. The Court reasoned that that clause
“contemplates phase-in, phase-out services of a kind different from the usual services
performed under the contract” and that, by contrast, “Arko performed the same type
of services [after expiration of the fourth one-year option] as it did during the
previous period.” Id.
446. Id. at 1380.
447. ASBCA No. 52280, 52281, 02-2 BCA ¶ 31943 (2002).
448. Id.; see also Vernon J. Edwards, Postscript: When the Government Can Choose
Among Options, 21 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 57 (2007).
449. Arko, 553 F.3d at 1379–80.
450. 587 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
451. Id. at 1372.
452. Id. at 1366.
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Prior to bidding on the contract, States Roofing inspected the roof
and observed that a prior contractor had applied waterproofing paint
453
on the roof. Based on this information and its interpretation of the
contract, States Roofing accounted only for the costs of
454
waterproofing paint when preparing its bid.
The Government
objected to States Roofing’s approach after performance began,
however, and insisted that the contract required the installation of
455
flashing, which was more costly than paint.
States Roofing
complied with the Government’s demands and then requested an
456
equitable adjustment for the additional costs.
On appeal from the CO’s denial of States Roofing’s claim, the
Board held that the contract contained a patent ambiguity for which
457
States Roofing was obligated to inquire.
The Board also reasoned
that details in drawings included with the solicitation should have put
States Roofing on notice that something more than waterproofing
458
paint was required.
The Board came to this conclusion
notwithstanding the revelation that the Government “inadvertently”
omitted key specifications from the contract that could have
459
prevented the misunderstanding.
Thus, while the Board
recognized States Roofing’s pre-bid efforts to ascertain the
appropriate method of waterproofing, it concluded that the patent
ambiguity contained in the contract meant that States Roofing had a
460
duty to inquire before proceeding with the contract.
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, finding that the
contract’s ambiguity on this issue was latent, not patent, and “that
States Roofing’s interpretation was within the zone of
461
reasonableness.” The Court found that the totality of the evidence
and circumstances—particularly the use of waterproofing paint on
the roof by prior contractors—meant that States Roofing’s
462
interpretation was reasonable.
Conflicting expert testimony
463
weighed in favor of States Roofing’s interpretation, and the fact
that the Government omitted key specifications that could have

453. Id. at 1367.
454. Id. at 1369.
455. Id. at 1367.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 1368.
458. Id.
459. Id. (finding another document provided to the contractor sufficiently
indicated the need for the flashing material).
460. Id. at 1367–68, 1372.
461. Id. at 1372.
462. Id.
463. Id.
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avoided the misunderstanding weighed heavily on the Court’s
464
465
Applying the rule of contra proferentem, the
decision as well.
Federal Circuit construed the ambiguity against the contract’s drafter
466
and held in favor of States Roofing.
C. Cost Accounting Issues
In both of its 2009 decisions addressing contract cost principles,
the Federal Circuit declared that it was bound by prior decisions, to
the detriment of the contractors involved. The court strictly
interpreted the cost regulations involved in each of the cases.
Accordingly, government contractors need to be familiar with these
Federal Circuit decisions and factor them into their business
decisions regarding whether and when to settle disagreements with
third parties and the Government. Failure to do so could lead to
significant unallowed contract costs or severe interest penalties.
Geren v. Tecom, Inc.
The Federal Circuit reversed a summary judgment decision of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA or “the Board”)
467
The ASBCA held that Tecom’s defense
in favor of Tecom, Inc.
costs and settlement payments associated with a Title VII sexual
harassment suit were allowable costs under the Federal Acquisition
468
Regulation (FAR).
Tecom sought to include $96,163.16 in legal
fees in its indirect cost pool for general and administrative expenses
(G&A) and to bill the $50,000 settlement payment, for which Tecom
admitted no wrongdoing, as direct costs to the contract on which the
469
alleged sexual harassment had occurred. The Federal Circuit held
that, had the lawsuit proceeded to trial, costs associated with an
adverse judgment would not be allowable under the contract, and
that “defense and settlement costs are allowable only if the contractor
can show that the plaintiff in the Title VII suit had very little
470
likelihood of success” on the merits.
The ASBCA held that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Boeing North
471
American, Inc. v. Roche, which established the standard of “very little
likelihood of success on the merits” for reimbursement of legal and
1.

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Geren v. Tecom, Inc., 566 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. (citing Tecom, Inc., ASBCA No. 53884, 54461, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33674 (2007)).
Id.
Id.
298 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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472

settlement costs, was limited to circumstances where the underlying
lawsuit alleged that the contractor had engaged in criminal conduct,
473
The Federal
fraud, or violations of the Major Fraud Act of 1988.
Circuit disagreed, declaring that Boeing was not limited to its facts, but
instead applied to “all private settlements where defense and
judgment costs would be disallowed if the case went to final judgment
474
against the contractor.”
The Federal Circuit applied a two-step analysis to determine if
475
defense and settlement costs are allowable under FAR subpart 31.2.
The first step is to determine whether damages, costs or attorney’s
fees would be allowable if the lawsuit proceeded to trial and an
476
adverse judgment was issued.
In this case, the court held that
litigation costs associated with a Title VII lawsuit would not have been
allowable under the FAR because the contract contained the clause at
477
FAR § 52.222-26, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
478
Thus, sexual harassment would breach the contract terms.
The
Federal Circuit held that costs resulting from a contract breach are
479
unallowable under the precedent of the claims court.
Having determined that the costs would not be reimbursable if the
Title VII plaintiff had obtained an adverse judgment against Tecom,
the Federal Circuit proceeded to the next step in its inquiry—
determining whether the costs of settlement are allowable. Here, the
Federal Circuit held that its decision in Boeing controlled, even
though Boeing addressed only defense costs rather than settlement
480
payments.
Applying Boeing, the Federal Circuit concluded that if
damages or penalties resulting from an adverse judgment would be
disallowed under the contract, settlement costs also are unallowable
“unless the contractor can establish that the private Title VII plaintiff
481
had very little likelihood of success on the merits.”

472. Id. at 1288–89.
473. Geren, 566 F.3d at 1040.
474. Id. at 1046.
475. Id. at 1041.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 1043.
478. Id. at 1044.
479. Id. at 1043 (citing Dade Bros., Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 239, 240 (Ct. Cl.
1963)).
480. Id. at 1046.
481. Id.
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Gates v. Raytheon Co.
The Federal Circuit reversed a decision of the ASBCA and held
that failure to make an adjustment during the current accounting
period stemming from the sale, discontinued operations, or other
closure of a business segment violates Cost Accounting Standard
483
(CAS) 413-50
and results in increased payments by the
484
Most importantly, the court found that Raytheon
Government.
owed interest compounded daily on the amount it was required to
485
repay the Government.
The case stems from Raytheon’s sale of two business units,
in December 1998 and July 2000, which had performed CAS-covered
486
government contracts.
After each sale, Raytheon and the
Government eventually agreed on the amount of the Government’s
share of surplus pension costs for the closed business segments under
487
CAS 413-50(c)(12).
On September 21, 2004, Raytheon paid the
agreed upon amounts ($487,305 and $14,681,268), but refused to pay
the simple interest the Government had requested on those
488
amounts.
The CO later issued a final decision that Raytheon had
not complied with the CAS 413 requirements to make pension
surplus adjustments in the current accounting period and therefore
489
owed interest to the Government.
The ASBCA initially granted summary judgment in favor of the
Government, holding that Raytheon’s failure to promptly provide an
adjustment for the Government’s share of the surplus pension costs
490
resulted in noncompliance with CAS 413. Because the Board found
that Raytheon’s noncompliance led to increased Government costs,
Raytheon was held liable for interest under the “CAS clause” in its
491
Government contracts, FAR § 52.230-2.
The Board also held that
this interest should be calculated using daily compounding under
492
26 U.S.C. §§ 6621-22. On reconsideration, the ASBCA reversed its
earlier decision and held that the record was unclear on the
493
accounting treatment of the surplus adjustments.
The ASBCA
2.

482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

584 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50 (2009).
Raytheon, 584 F.3d at 1063–65.
Id. at 1071–72.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1065–66.
See Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 54907, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33655, at 14 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 13.
Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 54907, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33859, at 1–2 (2008).
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determined that the Government had failed to show any increased
494
The Board therefore
costs had resulted from a CAS violation.
concluded that the CAS clause did not apply, and no interest was due
495
from Raytheon.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[o]n the
undisputed facts, it is clear that Raytheon violated CAS 413” by not
paying the pension adjustments in the same accounting periods in
496
which the sales of the business segments occurred. The court also
found that this noncompliance increased the Government’s costs on
the Raytheon contracts that were open during those accounting
periods, in other words, the Government’s payments on those open
contracts would have been lower if Raytheon had complied with CAS
497
413 by crediting those contracts at the appropriate time.
Having
determined that Raytheon violated CAS 413 and that the violation
resulted in increased costs to the Government, the Federal Circuit
then turned to 41 U.S.C. § 422(h) to determine how interest on the
498
Government’s overpayments should be calculated.
As the Federal Circuit explained, § 442(h) applies the annual
interest rate designated by section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code
to CAS violations:
The interest rate applicable to any contract price adjustment shall
be the annual rate of interest established under section 6621 of
title 26 for such period. Such interest shall accrue from the time
payments of the increased costs were made to the contractor or
subcontractor to the time the United States receives full
499
compensation for the price adjustment.

Section 6622 of the Internal Revenue Code then requires daily
compounding of “any interest required to be paid under this title or
500
sections 1961(c)(1) or 2411 of title 28, United States Code.”
In Raytheon, the Federal Circuit stated that it was bound by its
501
decision in Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States that statutes
like 41 U.S.C. § 442, “which require interest payments at the rate set

494. Id. at 2.
495. Id. at 3.
496. Raytheon, 584 F.3d at 1067.
497. Id. at 1068–69. In contrast, the ASBCA analyzed the issue of increased costs
by examining whether the Government had overpaid during previous accounting
periods. Id. at 1068.
498. Id. at 1069.
499. Id. at 1069–70 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 442(h)(4) (2006)).
500. Id at 1070 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6622(a) (2006)).
501. 884 F.2d 563 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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502

out in § 6621[,] require compound interest.” The Federal Circuit
explicitly stated that it could not contradict Canadian Fur Trappers,
even if Raytheon’s arguments appealed to the court and “may
503
support” a different interpretation of the statutes.
These statements seem to hint at the possibility of a future en banc
decision to overturn Canadian Fur Trappers. Unless and until such a
decision is issued, however, contractors will have to pay compound
interest for any CAS violation that results in increased Government
costs—likely resulting in enormous penalties for contractors.
D. Termination for Default
504

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States
The Federal Circuit’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United
States brought a final conclusion to eighteen years of litigation
(including three rounds of appeals) resulting from the U.S. Navy’s
1991 termination for default of the contract held by McDonnell
Douglas and General Dynamics for development of the A-12 Avenger
505
stealth aircraft. The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s judgment
that the termination for default was justified based on the
506
The Federal Circuit’s last
contractors’ failure to make progress.
opinion in this case addresses the issue of when a contract can be
terminated for default for failure to make progress in the absence of
507
a definitive contract completion date.
But perhaps the most
important lesson to be learned from the saga of this dispute is that
fixed-price research and development contracts are fraught with risk
for both the contractor and the Government and should be entered
into only after careful review of the business case and contract
508
terms.
The Navy awarded the $4.7 billion, fixed-price research and
509
development contract in 1988.
The contract required delivery of
eight prototype aircraft between June 1990 and January 1991 and
provided the Navy the option to purchase four production lots of

1.

502. 584 F.3d at 1070 (citing Canadian Fur Trappers, 884 F.2d at 568 (applying
compound interest to international trade and tariff duties)).
503. Id. at 1071, n.10.
504. 567 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (McDonnell Douglas XIV).
505. Id. at 1342.
506. Id. at 1355–56.
507. Id. at 1351–53.
508. See id. at 1355–56 (noting that both parties realized the contract was a
mistake).
509. Id. at 1342.
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aircraft.
The Navy exercised its option in May 1990 for six
production aircraft that were to be delivered between June 1991 and
511
The contractors encountered significant performance
May 1992.
problems from the beginning, which led them to miss the first flight
date in June 1990 and to propose a modification to the contract’s
512
fixed-price structure.
The contractors anticipated that the costs
513
necessary to complete the contract would be “unacceptable.”
When the contractors missed the first flight date, the CO sent a letter
“expressing ‘serious concern’ regarding the deficient performance”
and requesting the contractors’ plan to meet the original contract
514
schedule, as well as a proposed contract revision. The Navy issued a
unilateral modification in August 1990 to revise the prototype
delivery dates; the modification did not revise the delivery dates for
515
the production aircraft.
The contractors continued to experience
delays and to rack up additional costs, leading them in November
1990 to request that the Navy restructure the contract to a
516
cost-reimbursement type contract.
In December 1990, “then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
directed the Secretary of the Navy to show cause by January 4, 1991,
517
why the A-12 program should not be terminated.” The Navy issued
a cure notice on December 17, 1990, which stated that the
contractors’ performance was “unsatisfactory” and that they had
failed to meet specification requirements or fabricate parts to meet
518
the delivery schedule.
During meetings between Government
personnel and the contractors, the contractors admitted that they
could not meet the revised schedules or some of the specifications,
and the Navy terminated the contract for default on January 7,
519
1991.
The contractors claimed that they were not in default
because the specifications and delivery schedules were
520
unachievable.
The contractors appealed both the termination and the
Government’s subsequent demand for $1.35 billion in unliquidated

510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1345.
Id.

2010]

2009 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

1053

521

progress payments at the COFC.
In the second appeal to the
Federal Circuit, the appellate court instructed the COFC to
determine the contract completion date under Lisbon Contractors, Inc.
522
v. United States.
The Federal Circuit explained that under Lisbon
Contractors, the Government was not required to establish “absolute
523
Instead, the
impossibility of performance” to justify default.
Government must show that the CO had a reasonable belief that
there was “no reasonable likelihood that the contractor could
perform the entire contract effort within the time remaining for
524
contract performance.” Applying Lisbon Contractors while using the
delivery dates in the Navy’s unilateral modification as a yardstick for
reasonable performance, the COFC concluded that the Government
was justified in terminating the contract for failure to make
525
progress.
In the third and final appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the
COFC that the contract as modified did not provide a definite
526
contract completion date. However, the court refused to adopt the
contractors’ argument that, under Lisbon Contractors, the absence of a
definite contract completion date absolutely precluded the
Government from justifiably terminating the contract for failure to
527
make progress. The Federal Circuit instead looked to the Court of
528
Claims’ decision in Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States, cited in
529
Lisbon Contractors, as well as previous McDonnell Douglas decisions.
In Universal Fiberglass, the Court of Claims held that the cure notice
served to inform the contractor when the time for default had been
reached in a case where the contract itself did not include a delivery
530
schedule.
The Federal Circuit found that the facts related to the
A-12 termination were sufficiently similar to those in Universal
531
Fiberglass to rely on the latter decision as precedent.
Considering
the totality of the circumstances, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the CO was reasonably justified in his belief that the contractors
521. Id.
522. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1018 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (McDonnell Douglas XII) (citing Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987)), aff’d, 567 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
523. Id. at 1015.
524. Id. at 1016 (citing Lisbon Contractors, 828 F.2d at 765).
525. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 385, 430 (2007)
(McDonnell Douglas XIII), aff’d, 567 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
526. McDonnell Douglas XIV, 567 F.3d at 1348.
527. Id.
528. 537 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
529. McDonnell Douglas XIV, 567 F.3d at 1347–48.
530. Universal Fiberglass, 537 F.2d at 398.
531. McDonnell Douglas XIV, 567 F.3d at 1350.
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could not timely complete the contract and therefore affirmed the
532
The Federal Circuit also reiterated that Lisbon
COFC’s judgment.
Contractors remains good law and that the conclusions in McDonnell
533
Douglas XIV were “dictated by the unique facts of this case.”
IV. WINSTAR AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CASES
After more than a dozen years of Winstar litigation, the Federal
Circuit has reached the point at which its decisions no longer blaze
paths announcing new precedent that dramatically affects the
outcomes of other cases. Instead, the court’s recent role has been
primarily limited to policing the COFC’s various decisions on issues
of the Government’s liability for breach and, more commonly, the
quantum of damages. Following years in which there were virtually
no decisions affirming damage awards against the Government, the
balance has recently shifted and decisions from the COFC have slowly
but steadily presented the Federal Circuit with questions regarding
the effects of the Government’s breach and the nature of recoverable
damages. As the focus of many of the decisions shifts to damages,
they are more likely to center on traditional contractual concepts of
but-for or proximate causation and foreseeability, and to delve into
the nuances of highly fact-specific damage models that the plaintiff’s
and Government’s experts have prepared.
Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) cases have emerged as the new Winstar
cases, in the sense that there is a critical mass of factually similar cases
that are likely to focus primarily on individual plaintiffs’ entitlement
to, and the quantum of, damages. The Federal Circuit’s sole
published SNF decision in 2009 was consistent with its earlier
534
decisions in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States and Yankee
535
Atomic Electric Co. v. United States, in which the Federal Circuit
determined the proper method for calculating damages in a SNF case
is to include the “most reasonable measure of the contractual
acceptance rate” and that, while a trial court may apply the
substantial factor test to establish causation in SNF cases, a plausible
but-for world must still be established in any damages modeling to
536
calculate expectancy damages.

532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

Id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1356.
536 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
536 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Pacific Gas, 536 F.3d at 1292; Yankee Atomic, 536 F.3d at 1273.
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A. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. United States

In Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. United States, a Winstar
case, the Government arranged for Fidelity New York, F.S.B., a Long
Island savings and loan association (“thrift”), to absorb Suburbia
538
Federal Savings & Loan, another Long Island thrift about to fail.
In addition to a cash incentive to take on the failing thrift, the
Government agreed to allow Fidelity to favorably account for
“supervisory goodwill” generated by the transaction to meet Fidelity’s
regulatory capital maintenance requirements, and to amortize that
539
goodwill over a thirty-year period. Five years later, Congress passed
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
540
(FIRREA), which prohibited the favorable treatment of supervisory
goodwill, resulting in the breach at issue in the Winstar cases, and
541
which was the undisputed breach in this case.
Following the enactment of FIRREA, Astoria Federal Savings &
542
Loan Association merged with Fidelity and filed suit in the COFC.
The Government conceded that the statutory disallowance of the
supervisory goodwill resulted in a breach of its agreement with
Fidelity, and the COFC conducted a trial solely to determine
543
damages.
The COFC issued a judgment awarding Astoria
544
$16,042,877. “[T]he parties [did] not contest[] the court’s rulings
with respect to the bulk of the damages requested at trial, [however,]
the government [did seek] reversal with respect to several issues that
545
affect the size of the damages award.”
The Federal Circuit began its opinion with a review of the facts
specific to Fidelity’s situation, which affected the causal link between
the breach and certain damages. The court first noted that during
the early 1980s, Fidelity’s portfolio had been heavily invested in
commercial loans to developers of condominium and cooperative
546
conversion projects in the New York City area. Because Fidelity was
so heavily weighted in this area, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board

537. 568 F.3d 944 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
538. Id. at 946–47.
539. Id.
540. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
541. Astoria Federal, 568 F.3d at 946, 948.
542. Id. at 946.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id. at 947.
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(“the Bank Board”) had warned that “Fidelity’s asset management
547
strategy was giving rise to considerable credit risk exposure.”
At the same time, Suburbia was struggling and on the verge of
548
collapse due to its liabilities exceeding its assets. In order to avoid a
substantial deposit insurance liability that the Government would be
responsible for if Suburbia collapsed, the Government sought out
549
suitors to acquire the bank.
Fidelity agreed to acquire Suburbia in exchange for various
550
Included in these
inducements from the Government.
inducements was Fidelity’s ability to treat Suburbia’s net liabilities as
“supervisory goodwill” and account for the goodwill as regulatory
551
capital that would be amortized over a thirty-year period. Following
its acquisition of Suburbia, Fidelity continued to expand its
commercial real estate and construction loan portfolios to the point
where the Government grew concerned that Fidelity’s management
552
lacked the ability to run the company.
Two years after the
acquisition, Fidelity brought in a new, experienced management
553
team that immediately began to diversify Fidelity’s portfolio.
Despite Fidelity’s best efforts, when the New York real estate
market experienced a sudden downturn, it severely damaged
554
Fidelity’s balance sheet.
Based on these changes in market
conditions, Fidelity’s MACRO scores—the rating system used by
regulators to assess a thrift’s financial health, with 1 being the best
555
score and 5 being the worst—dropped across the board.
Following the passage of FIRREA, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) expanded its role in supervising thrifts and instituted
regulations severely limiting thrifts with low MACRO scores—like
556
Fidelity’s—from adding assets. Regulatory Bulletin 3a-1 (“RB 3a-1”)
mandated that “any thrift that had been deemed ‘insolvent’ or had
received an overall MACRO score of 4 or 5 would be restricted to
557
little or no growth in assets.” Post-FIRREA, Fidelity could no longer
account for supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital or amortize that

547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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558

goodwill over the thirty-year period.
Accordingly, OTS projected
Fidelity would fail to satisfy regulatory capital requirements at the
time FIRREA became effective and thus required Fidelity to prepare a
capital restoration plan that would bring Fidelity back into capital
559
compliance.
As part of this plan, Fidelity agreed to reduce its
560
projected asset growth to almost zero.
For nearly three years, Fidelity functioned under strict OTS
561
oversight.
“In May 1993, Fidelity converted from mutual to stock
ownership [and] used the proceeds from the public offering to
562
complete [its] capital restoration plan.”
After successfully
completing its plan, OTS lifted its restrictions and Fidelity was free to
563
However, after
attempt to grow its assets at a normal rate.
operating subject to the OTS’s severe restrictions that had applied to
thrifts with poor MACRO ratings for so many years, Fidelity was no
564
longer competitive in the market.
Based on its market position, Fidelity elected to merge with Astoria
565
in January 1995. “Goodwill” from the Suburbia transaction did not
566
567
Fidelity/Astoria then sued in the COFC
survive the merger.
“alleging that the enactment of FIRREA resulted in a breach of the
government’s agreement to count Suburbia’s goodwill toward
Fidelity’s regulatory capital requirements and to permit the
568
amortization of that goodwill over a 30-year period.”
The
Government did not dispute liability but did dispute damages, and
the COFC found that Fidelity was entitled to $16,042,887 in lost
profits and “wounded bank” damages attributed to Fidelity’s higher
569
operating costs based on the breach. The damages award included
purported damages extending through January 1995 to account for
570
the residual effects of the breach.
The Government subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit,
raising multiple challenges to the award of damages. First, the
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. See id. (noting that due to the capital restoration plan, the OTS District
Director would have to authorize the origination of new loans or investments).
562. Id. at 949.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. For simplicity’s sake, the plaintiff/appellee will continue to be referred to as
“Fidelity” throughout this Section.
568. Astoria Federal, 568 F.3d at 949.
569. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
570. Id.
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Government contended that, due to Fidelity’s financial state prior to
the breach, even absent FIRREA, OTS would have had the power
under RB 3a-1 to limit Fidelity’s growth during the period in question
and, therefore, the damages Fidelity incurred could not be attributed
571
to the breach. The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the Government
and rejecting both the COFC’s finding and the arguments raised by
Fidelity, found that in the hypothetical non-breach world, Fidelity
would have nonetheless been subject to stricter OTS oversight and
that Fidelity’s growth would have been restricted even in the absence
572
of any breach.
Accordingly, the court found that “the evidence
indicates that as of January 1990 and for at least some period
thereafter, Fidelity would have been unable to grow in accordance
with its growth plan due to government restrictions imposed under
573
[OTS’s authority].”
Thus, the court remanded the case to the
COFC with instructions to revise the damages award based on the
574
effect the OTS regulations would have had in a non-breach world.
The court next affirmed the COFC’s other findings related to
causation and determined that “absent FIRREA, Fidelity would have
improved its overall MACRO score to 3 or better prior to July 1992,”
and therefore, Fidelity would have been able to escape the
575
restrictions placed upon it at that time. The court also affirmed the
COFC’s finding that Fidelity could have improved its MACRO rating
before July 1992 if FIRREA was not passed and could have continued
576
with its expansion plans but for the breach.
The Government also argued that the COFC should have denied
Fidelity “wounded bank” damages for the five months preceding
577
Fidelity’s stock conversion.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
COFC’s finding that Fidelity was entitled to “wounded bank” damages
for at least the latter half of 1992 because Fidelity’s overall MACRO
rating would have been a 3, not a 4, resulting in lower operating costs
578
during that period, but-for the breach. However, the exact period
for calculating these damages was unclear, and the Federal Circuit
remanded with instructions that the COFC “should make a finding as
to when, in the hypothetical non-breach world, OTS would have been
satisfied that the limitations of [its regulations] were unnecessary” to
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.

Id. at 949–50.
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 953.
Id.
Id. at 953–54.
Id. at 953.
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579

determine appropriate damages. Based upon this date, “the court
should fashion an appropriate award based on the evidence of lost
580
profits and ‘wounded bank’ damages.”
The court also addressed whether the damages award should be
reduced or offset by certain additional costs Fidelity would have
581
realized in the hypothetical non-breach world.
First, “[t]he
[G]overnment [sought] a $3.6 million reduction in the award based
on the . . . expenses Fidelity would have incurred had it expanded its
582
retail lending operations as it had planned to do in the late 1980s.”
The court rejected the Government’s argument and affirmed the
COFC’s finding that Fidelity’s expert’s damages analysis was
reasonable; in particular, agreeing with his decision not to include
certain expenses, such as the salary and advertising expenses Fidelity
would have incurred, based on the theory that any additional costs
583
would have been offset by the additional profit generated.
However, the court agreed with the Government’s argument that the
COFC should have reduced the damages based on the increased OTS
fees that Fidelity would have incurred had it been able to achieve its
584
projected growth from 1990 to 1993.
Finally, with respect to how
any “non-contractual goodwill” would have affected the lost profits
damages model, the court affirmed the COFC’s finding that “Fidelity
would have sustained a growth rate of eight percent even if it had
585
been carrying only $37 million in excess regulatory capital.”
586

B. 1st Home Liquidating Trust v. United States

In 1st Home Liquidating Trust v. United States, 1st Home was a mutual
587
thrift owned by its depositors.
Years before Congress passed
FIRREA, 1st Home sought to convert from a mutual thrift to a stockownership thrift to avoid insolvency through a voluntary supervisory
conversion in which one or more investors—not another thrift—
588
would provide the capital necessary to save the ailing thrift.
1st Home required the Bank Board approval to complete the
589
voluntary conversion. In its “Application for Voluntary Supervisory
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.

Id. at 954.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 954–55.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 955–56 (internal quotations omitted).
581 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id.
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Conversion,” 1st Home sought a regulatory forbearance from the
Bank Board and included in its business plan the proposed use of
purchase-method accounting that would allow it to create a large
590
amount of goodwill through the conversion.
The Bank Board
granted the forbearance request, but for three years, rather than the
591
five years requested by 1st Home. The Bank Board’s response did
not include any mention of 1st Home’s plan regarding its attempts to
generate goodwill, but internal memoranda indicated that it believed
the conversion would generate the goodwill 1st Home claimed it
592
would.
593
FIRREA
1st Home completed the conversion in October 1986.
was subsequently passed, which prohibited 1st Home from
continuing to count regulatory goodwill towards its capital
594
requirements, as contemplated in its approved conversion plans.
This change led to 1st Home’s demise and eventual voluntary
595
liquidation.
Post-liquidation assets were transferred to a trust
which, along with the 1st Home investors, sued the Government for
breach of contract; they argued that the Government had a
contractual obligation to permit 1st Home to continue to amortize
goodwill over the approved period and that its inability to do so,
596
following the passage of FIRREA, breached that obligation.
The COFC granted summary judgment in favor of 1st Home and
597
awarded damages in the amount of $26 million. The COFC found
that the application for a voluntary conversion—along with the
business plan submitted to the Bank Board—constituted an offer,
that the Government counter-offered with a shorter forbearance
period but accepted all other terms, and that 1st Home’s conduct
598
constituted acceptance of the offer.
As part of this “contract,”
1st Home had the right to utilize “purchase-method accounting”
which would have resulted in approximately $40 million of regulatory
599
goodwill amortized over a thirty-year period.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC, finding that no
contract existed between the Bank Board and 1st Home (or its

590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.

Id. at 1353–54.
Id.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1354–55.
Id.
Id. at 1353.
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600

investors) regarding regulatory goodwill.
Noting that “[t]he party
asserting the existence of a contract ‘must show (1) mutuality of
intent to contract; (2) consideration; and (3) lack of ambiguity in
offer and acceptance,’” the court found that there was “nothing more
than a granular cloud of evidence indicating that 1st Home and the
601
Government contracted regarding goodwill.”
The court, comparing this case to its recent decision in Suess v.
602
United States,
reiterated that the approval of amortization of
goodwill, alone, does not constitute a guarantee or agreement that a
603
thrift will be permitted to amortize goodwill as per the approval.
Thus, because all the Government had done in this case was
acknowledge and approve of 1st Home’s proposed accounting
method and treatment of goodwill, there was no evidence that the
Government had the requisite intent to enter into a contract
regarding 1st Home’s treatment of the goodwill and, accordingly,
604
no contract was formed.
The fact that the Bank Board had
benefited from and encouraged 1st Home’s conversion had no effect
on the court’s analysis, as neither constituted negotiations between
605
the Government and the thrift. Likewise, neither the fact that the
investors believed the Government had promised favorable
accounting treatment nor the fact that the voluntary conversion
made financial sense only if the goodwill could be amortized over an
extended period of time, were evidence of any mutual intent to
606
Furthermore, the
contract regarding the treatment of goodwill.
court’s analysis was not affected by the fact that the Bank Board had
“conditioned its approval of the conversion on receiving an
accountant’s letter detailing the proposed amortization of
607
goodwill.”
Finally, the court noted that, unlike in other cases where a contract
had been recognized regarding the treatment of regulatory goodwill,
here the Government had not “clearly incentivized the relevant
transactions by providing cash assistance or by making express
promises regarding the accounting treatment of supervisory
608
goodwill.”
The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he lack of such
600. Id. at 1355.
601. Id. (quoting D & N Bank v. United States, 331 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
602. 535 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
603. 1st Home, 581 F.3d at 1356.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 1356–57.
606. Id. at 1357.
607. Id.
608. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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incentives in this case supports the view that a contract was not
609
Thus, “[b]ecause the Government lacked the requisite
formed.”
intent to enter into a contract with 1st Home regarding the
accounting treatment of goodwill to be generated by 1st Home’s
conversion, no contract was formed, and thus, there was no
610
breach.”
The Federal Circuit accordingly reversed the COFC’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of 1st Home and remanded the
611
case for the COFC to enter judgment in favor of the Government.
612

C. Slattery v. United States

Like the other Winstar cases, Slattery v. United States involved the
acquisition of a failing thrift by a healthy bank at the behest of the
613
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In 1982, the FDIC
encouraged Meritor Savings Bank to merge with the failing Western
614
Savings Fund Society.
Among the incentives the FDIC gave to
Meritor to acquire Western was a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) that would allow Meritor to treat Western’s net liabilities as
“supervisory goodwill” and count that goodwill towards Meritor’s
615
regulatory capital requirements, amortized over fifteen years.
Though the FDIC had to provide over $294 million in other
incentives to finalize the merger, it would have cost over $400 million
more to liquidate FDIC’s deposit insurance liability in the event
616
Western failed.
Notwithstanding frequent modifications to its regulatory
requirements in response to the financial landscape in the 1980s,
the FDIC continued to allow Meritor to use its supervisory goodwill to
617
meet regulatory requirements.
However, the FDIC asked Meritor
to enter into a new MOU under which Meritor would maintain a
minimum capital requirement in excess of the regulatory minimum
618
of 5.5%, but it withdrew that request.
Later, the FDIC forced
Meritor to accept yet another MOU, raising the capital requirement
619
to 6.5%. This new MOU also required that if Meritor did not satisfy
609. Id.
610. Id. at 1358.
611. Id.
612. 583 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 2010 WL 1030729
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 2010).
613. Id. at 804.
614. Id. at 803–04.
615. Id. at 804.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 805
618. Id.
619. Id. at 805–06.
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the 6.5% capital requirement by the end of 1988, it would need to
increase its tangible capital by $200 million and present a five-year
620
When Meritor
strategic plan to improve its financial health.
subsequently failed to timely satisfy its capital requirement, it was
forced to sell fifty-four of its branches and enter into yet another
621
agreement with the FDIC.
Near the end of 1991, after the passage of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) the FDIC
622
began to issue new rules to implement FDICIA. One of these rules,
which would take effect on December 19, 1992, interpreted the
FDICIA to prohibit the inclusion of supervisory goodwill associated
623
with mergers with failing institutions as regulatory capital.
The final agreement entered between Meritor and the FDIC
regarding Meritor’s takeover of Western was reached with full
knowledge of the proposed FDICIA legislation but before the FDIC
624
had adopted any new rules.
Meritor could not survive under these new regulations and rules,
and Meritor’s Board of Directors authorized the FDIC to sell the
625
bank in October 1992.
Soon thereafter, the FDIC informed
Meritor that when its newest regulation took effect on December 19,
1992, disallowing the supervisory goodwill, Meritor’s capital ratio
would drop from 7.5% to 0.66% and it would be “critically
626
undercapitalized.”
Two days later, the FDIC revoked Meritor’s
deposit insurance, causing the Pennsylvania Secretary of Banking to
627
immediately seize the bank.
Slattery, an individual owner of Meritor stock, brought both a class
action and a shareholders’ derivative suit in 1993 in the COFC
alleging that the FDIC breached its 1982 contract in connection with
628
Meritor’s merger with Western.
The COFC dismissed the class
629
Following a
action suit but allowed the derivative suit to proceed.
five-month trial, the COFC found the Government liable for breach,
and the Government appealed on multiple grounds, including
630
whether the COFC had jurisdiction over the claim.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.

Id. at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 806–07.
Id. at 807.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed the Government’s
argument that the COFC lacked jurisdiction over the claim because
the FDIC is a non-appropriated funds instrumentality (NAFI), “which
631
does not receive its monies via congressional appropriation.” NAFIs
are not subject to the Tucker Act or the COFC’s limited
632
After thoroughly examining the history of the FDIC
jurisdiction.
and its initial appropriations, the Federal Circuit applied the test
633
annunciated in AINS, Inc. v. United States to determine whether the
FDIC is a NAFI and affirmed the COFC’s ruling that the FDIC did
not meet the fourth factor of this test (which requires a clear
Congressional intent to exclude the FDIC from appropriated
634
funds).
Therefore, the COFC properly exercised jurisdiction over
635
Slattery’s claim.
Turning to liability, the court affirmed the COFC’s finding that the
1982 MOU was a legally binding contract with Meritor that the FDIC
636
had breached.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the COFC’s
finding that the FDIC had indicated a clear intent to allow Meritor to
count supervisory goodwill towards its regulatory capital and that this
concession was material to Meritor’s agreement to take on the failing
637
thrift.
The COFC had found that the Government had first breached the
1982 MOU “in 1988 when it effectively ignored Meritor’s right to rely
on goodwill as capital, deemed the bank to be in a dangerous
position with respect to capital reserves, and required it to enter into
638
the 1988 MOU which raised its total capital requirements.”
The COFC also found that the 1988 MOU, which Meritor entered
into under duress, led directly to the “downward spiral” of the bank
639
and forced the sale of its most valuable assets.
Rejecting all the
Government’s arguments to the contrary, the Federal Circuit found
that the COFC committed no clear error in its interpretation of the
1982 MOU and “affirm[ed] the ruling that the FDIC breached the
1982 MOU when it required and continued to require Meritor to
increase its primary capital,” causing Meritor’s downward spiral and
640
the sale of its most valuable assets.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.

Id. at 808 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
365 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Slattery, 583 F.3d at 809–12.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812–13.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 813–16.
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As for damages, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s
641
The Government appealed
$371,733,059 award on most grounds.
several aspects of the damages award; Slattery cross-appealed, arguing
that the trial court should have accepted the alternative damages
642
theory because the FDIC avoided $696 million in liquidation costs.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s award of $276 million in
“lost value” damages based on Meritor’s market valuation
immediately prior to the Government’s first breach, which the COFC
643
characterized as a form of expectancy damages. This valuation was
based on a complicated damages model presented by Slattery’s
644
damages expert, which the COFC accepted.
On appeal, the
Government did not challenge the lost value theory, but did
645
challenge the calculations and how the amount was reached.
The Federal Circuit found none of the Government’s arguments
persuasive and held that the Government failed to establish any
646
offsetting events that would have reduced the damages award. The
Federal Circuit also affirmed the COFC’s use of a “control premium”
in valuation of the entire bank as a unit, finding that the Government
had not “shown clear error in the court’s resolution of competing
expert testimony to rule that lost value is reasonably measured by the
647
value of the entire franchise including a control premium.”
The Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision on two grounds.
First, the court found “that the trial court erred in awarding both the
net cost of entering the contract, and the value lost due to the
648
breach.”
While these two grounds of recovery did not technically
“overlap,” the $67 million in restitution damages was incompatible
649
Likewise,
with the lost value award and thus had to be reversed.
because the lost value award had been affirmed, the Federal Circuit
reversed as duplicative the COFC’s award of $28 million in “wounded
bank” damages—an assessment of the costs Meritor incurred in
trying to sell major assets in order to comply with the increases in
650
capital requirements.
Finally, the court denied Slattery’s cross

641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.

Id. at 816–25.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 816–18.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 817–18.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id. at 820–21 (an issue both parties agreed upon).
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appeal for damages equivalent to the savings achieved by the FDIC in
651
preventing Western’s liquidation by its merger with Meritor.
Judge Gajarsa dissented from the majority’s decision, arguing that
the FDIC qualifies as a NAFI under Federal Circuit precedent and,
therefore, the case should have been remanded to the COFC with
652
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
653

D. Republic Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. United States

In Republic Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, in an attempt to save
nearly $30 million, the Government solicited a takeover of two failing
thrifts: Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association of Matteson,
Illinois (“Citizens”) and Fireside Federal Savings and Loan
654
Association of Cicero, Illinois (“Fireside”).
Douglas Crocker and
Robert Bobb won the right to purchase Citizens and Fireside and
formed Republic Holding Company, Inc. (RHC) to do so, with MCB
Financial Group, Inc. (MCB) as the holding company’s sole
655
shareholder. Meadows Resources, Inc. and a voting trust controlled
656
by Crocker and Bobb owned MCB equally.
On August 30, 1985, RHC purchased Citizens and Fireside and
657
merged them together to form Republic Savings Bank F.S.B (RSB).
Through various agreements with the Bank Board, the investors
provided $17 million in capital and the Government contributed an
658
additional $3 million to bring RSB’s total capital to $20 million.
Under these agreements, Meadows, MCB and RHC—the plaintiffs—
promised to keep RSB’s net worth above certain levels, while the
Government promised to allow RSB to use the “purchase method” of
accounting that would permit RSB to apply the goodwill created by
659
the transaction to satisfy regulatory capital requirements.
When Congress passed FIRREA in 1989, new capital rules
660
eventually led to RSB being seized by the Government.
Despite
RSB’s compliance with the capital standards outlined in its
agreement with the Government, the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) took control of the thrift on June 5, 1992, when RSB could not

651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.

Id. at 821–24.
Id. at 829–32.
584 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1371–72.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1372–73.
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comply with the new capital standards imposed by the OTS pursuant
661
RTC subsequently sold RSB to Regency Savings Bank
to FIRREA.
for $926,000—of which only $284,940.71 remained after the
Government paid administrative fees associated with the
662
receivership. The FDIC, which at this point was administering the
receivership, paid the remainder to Meadows as the final distribution
663
of the receivership.
The plaintiffs—Meadows, MCB, and RHC—brought suit in June
1992 alleging, among other things, breach of contract based on RSB’s
inability to count its goodwill towards its capital requirements
following the passage of FIRREA, and seeking $17 million in
restitution for its capital contribution and $926,000 in “profit” based
664
on what the Government was paid for RSB.
The COFC granted
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them
$14,641,059.29 in damages, consisting of the cash contribution minus
the $3 million contributed by the Government and the difference
between the price paid to the Government for RSB and the
665
remainder already paid to Meadows.
The Government appealed the COFC’s damages award arguing,
among other things, that the Plaintiffs’ alleged $17 million
capitalization contribution actually amounted to no more than
$2.235 million and that it was error for the COFC to award restitution
666
based on the $926,000 sale premium.
Plaintiffs cross appealed,
arguing that the COFC should not have offset its award by the
667
$3 million Government contribution.
In denying the Government’s appeal of the $14 million dollar
restitution award based on the Plaintiffs’ initial pledge contribution
(as offset by the Government’s $3 million contribution), the court
rejected all of the Government’s arguments that the COFC had
668
The Government first
overstated the value of the contribution.
argued that the initial $17 million cash contribution pledged by the
plaintiffs, consisting of $5 million in equity in Bellamah Community
Development (a real estate company owned by Meadows and MCB)
and a $12 million dollar earnings preference on BCD’s future

661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.

Id.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1376.
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earnings, “were so ephemeral as to be incapable of valuation.”
In rejecting this argument, the court found that the contribution the
Plaintiffs had pledged were “real assets with an objective worth and
670
[were] therefore clearly recoverable.”
The court also rejected the
Government’s argument that the restitution should be limited to the
value of the income the assets pledged actually produced, as only
$2.235 million from the $12 million earnings preference was ever
collected, finding that the assets needed to be valued at the time of
671
contracting.
The court did reverse the COFC, however, on the award of
restitution based on the premium related to the sale of RSB, finding
that the COFC could not “unwind Plaintiffs’ initial capital
contributions without also unwinding their claim to RSB’s sale
672
premium.” The court noted that the Plaintiffs had not, and could
not tie their efforts in turning the failing thrifts into a profitable
673
entity to the sale premium. Thus, the court found that “[t]he sale
premium was not a valid basis for restitution and the court erred by
674
including the net sale premium in Plaintiffs’ award.”
The court also agreed with the Government that the COFC
improperly failed to offset the damages award by $4.287 million in
tax benefits the Plaintiffs received as a result of purchasing the
675
thrifts. The Plaintiffs did not contest that they had benefited from
this tax advantage, but argued that it should not reduce their award
because the benefit did not come directly from any contractual
676
requirement.
The court concluded that while not specifically
incorporated into the contract, “[t]he tax benefits were not some
remote consequence of the contract in which the government took
no part . . . . [They] were [actually] a crucial motivating force behind
677
their willingness to take over the two failing thrifts.” Furthermore,
the Plaintiffs had to specifically request that the Bank Board make a
special authorization to allow them to take advantage of the tax
678
benefits. Thus, the court found that “[u]nder these circumstances,

669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
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we cannot conclude that the government’s actions were irrelevant to
679
the tax benefit.”
Finally, the court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court
erred by offsetting their restitution by the $3 million the Government
680
had contributed.
The court reasoned that all the Plaintiffs,
including RSB (who was the direct beneficiary of the $3 million cash
contribution), benefited directly or indirectly from the contribution
and thus should not be allowed to reap this benefit twice through the
681
award of restitution damages.
682

E. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States

Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States arose out of the
Government’s breach of its numerous contracts with domestic
683
nuclear utilities to store high-level nuclear waste (HLW) and SNF.
The Plaintiffs, Carolina Power & Light Company and Florida Power
Corporation, collectively referred to by the court as “Progress
Energy,” operated five nuclear reactors at four power plants in the
684
South.
Progress Energy had entered into a contract with the
Department of Energy (DOE) under which DOE was to take title and
dispose of Progress Energy’s HLW and SNF in exchange for Progress
685
Energy paying a one-time charge and quarterly fees. This contract
was one of many “Standard Contract[s]” DOE had entered into with
686
various nuclear utilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.
Under the Standard Contract, no fixed rate at which DOE would
687
Instead, the DOE was
accept and dispose of waste was stated.
required to issue annual capacity reports (ACRs) and annual
acceptance priority rankings (APRs) to which the utilities were
required to submit a delivery commitment schedule (DCS) to identify
the SNF ready for delivery sixty-three months after the DCS
688
submission.
The Federal Circuit has previously referred to this
689
process as the acceptance capacity schedule (ACS) process.

679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
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689.
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Under the contract, DOE was required to begin to take control of
690
Progress Energy’s waste no later than January 31, 1998. DOE failed
to do so and as of December 31, 2005, despite Progress Energy paying
more than $660 million in fees, the DOE had not collected any waste
691
from Progress Energy. Based on the DOE’s clear breach, Progress
Energy sued in the Court of Federal Claims where the DOE did not
692
dispute liability, only the quantum of damages.
The COFC accepted the utilities’ damages model and awarded
693
The main issue in the
Progress Energy $82,789,289 in damages.
COFC was what acceptance rate should be applied to ascertain the
actual expenses incurred by Progress Energy because of DOE’s
694
breach.
As noted above, the Standard Contract did not include a
695
rate at which DOE would accept and dispose of SNF and HLW.
The COFC issued its opinion on June 19, 2008, in which it applied
the DOE’s 2004 ACR, meaning that it would apply an acceptance rate
of 3,000 metric tons of uranium (MTUs), as the measure of DOE’s
696
performance absent the breach.
In applying the 2004 ACR as the
proper standard, the COFC rejected the Government’s theory that
the 1991 ACS should have been applied, which would have dictated
an analysis based on an acceptance rate of only 900 MTUs and would
697
have resulted in damages of $47,755,006. The COFC also awarded
Progress Energy $4,231,710 in overhead costs, rejecting the
Government’s argument that these costs were not recoverable
698
because they were fixed costs not proximately related to the breach.
Less than two months after the COFC’s decision, the Federal Circuit
699
issued its opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States,
in which the court established the June 1987 ACS as the appropriate
SNF acceptance rate to be applied in determining damages—a rate
700
neither party had advocated in Carolina Power.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the COFC’s judgment based
701
on the precedent in Pacific Gas.
First, the court explained that it
did not accept the 1991 ACS as the proper measure of the parties’

690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
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intended rate of contractual performance because the 1991 ACS had
been influenced by “linkage requirements” of the Nuclear Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1987 that had rendered the Government’s
702
full performance unlikely.
Accordingly, the court had previously
selected the 1987 ACS “as the best metric to gauge the parties’
contractual intent” because this rate was developed prior to the
imposition of the linkage requirements and thus better reflected the
rate at a time when all parties realistically believed that the DOE
703
would accept SNF/HLW on time.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the Government’s assertions that
remand was inappropriate because Progress Energy had waived its
right to prove damages under the 1987 rates by not addressing those
rates at trial, or, alternatively, that Progress Energy should be
restricted to relying on only the evidence already in the trial record:
704
the Government’s evidence related to the 1991 rates.
The court
found that it would not penalize Progress Energy for pursuing its
litigation in good faith and not being able to predict or await the
705
outcome of related litigation.
The court also rejected Progress
Energy’s argument that remand was unnecessary because the
706
difference in the 1987 and 2004 rates was immaterial.
Because it
concluded that testing Progress Energy’s theory was a “profoundly
factual endeavor,” the Federal Circuit determined it was not in a
position to make factual findings even if it “may well be a matter that
707
can be tested by fairly simple arithmetic.”
Finally, the court affirmed the COFC’s damages award related to
overhead and indirect costs Progress Energy incurred as a result of
708
DOE’s breach. The two costs at issue were “stores overhead,” which
consisted primarily of warehousing costs and related labor, and
indirect overhead expenses, which consisted mainly of the salaries of
709
managers and financial employees.
The Federal Circuit affirmed
the COFC’s holding that Progress Energy should be allowed to
recover these overhead and indirect costs because the record showed
that Progress Energy had diverted warehousing and management
710
resources to mitigation projects.
The court also rejected the

702.
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Government’s assertion that this recovery should be offset by costs
Progress Energy avoided by not having to load DOE’s “transportation
711
casks” upon arrival to accept SNF. The Federal Circuit found that
these costs had only been deferred and not avoided, and that
eventually Progress Energy would have to pay these costs when DOE
712
finally collected SNF in the future.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s 2009 Government Contracts opinions reflect
significant developments in the court’s jurisprudence, particularly
with respect to (1) bid protests; (2) Government counterclaims
alleging fraud; (3) contract interpretation; and (4) cost accounting.
The court’s decisions in each of these areas will have a substantial
impact on Government Contracts litigation for the foreseeable
future.
First, although the number of precedential bid protest opinions is
713
noteworthy in and of itself, the court’s emphasis on the need for
judicial restraint and deference to procuring officials will likely
influence the COFC’s approach to these lawsuits for some time to
come. Litigants can expect that the COFC will redouble its efforts to
avoid “second-guessing” an agency’s procurement decisions and will
disturb those decisions only where there truly is no rational basis for
714
the agency’s actions. Moreover, if the COFC decisions issued in the
first seven months after Axiom are any indication, the Federal Circuit
likely will address the issue of supplementing the administrative
record again soon. Despite the Federal Circuit’s clear direction that
the contemporaneous record should be supplemented only under
narrow conditions, COFC judges have continued to liberally permit
additional material into the record and to rely on those documents in
their decisions. It seems only a matter of time before the Federal
Circuit steps in to re-emphasize that Esch is not the law in the Federal
Circuit and to re-iterate that APA record review should actually be
based on the record—not on documents created by the parties after a
715
protest is filed.
Second, the importance of the court’s decision in Daewoo cannot be
understated. Although the facts of that case are unique and not
likely to be repeated, several “lessons learned” should be considered
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.

Id. at 1277.
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by any contractor preparing large, complex claims against the
Government:
•

•

716.
717.
718.
719.
2009).
720.
2004).

Contractors must understand the CDA’s certification
requirement and what it means for a claim to be made in
716
Section 605 of the CDA requires that
“good faith.”
“the amount requested accurately reflects the contract
adjustment for which [the contractor] believes the
717
government is liable.” Daewoo underscores the importance
of identifying the causal connection between entitlement
and quantum, and avoiding communications that could be
characterized as a negotiating ploy or “horsetrading.”
Moreover, section 605 also requires that the “the
supporting data [be] accurate and complete to the best of
718
[the contractor’s] knowledge and belief.”
Contractors
must not only get their “facts straight” before submitting
claims to the Government, but judgmental factors in an
estimate of claim quantum must be both reasonable and
consistently applied.
Contractors should avoid “total cost/total delay” claims
unless the facts justify such an approach. The Federal
Circuit’s primary criticism of Daewoo’s claim was that it
improperly “assumed that the government was responsible
for each day of [delay], without even considering whether
there was any contractor-caused delay or delay for which
719
the government was not responsible.”
A total cost
approach is permissible only when (1) it is impracticable to
prove actual losses directly, (2) the contractor’s bid was
reasonable, (3) the contractor’s actual costs are reasonable,
and (4) responsibility for the contractor’s added costs
720
belong entirely to the Government.
Where total
cost/delay claims (or “modified” total cost/delay claims)
are pursued, contractors should document their effort to
identify and adjust for contractor-caused delays and
inefficiencies.

41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (2006).
Id.
Id.
Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
See Hi-Shear Tech. Corp. v. United States, 356 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
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Contractors should obtain input from outside experts in
preparing large and/or complex claims. Although the
CDA was intended to avoid trial-like processes and
“to induce resolution of more contract disputes by
721
negotiation prior to litigation,”
the Federal Circuit
criticized Daewoo for not using outside experts to prepare
its claim and observed that Daewoo’s trial experts “treated
the certified claim computation as essentially worthless, did
722
not utilize it, and did not even bother to understand it.”
Even where good faith/fraud are not at issue, experienced
counsel and cost experts should be consulted to brainstorm
approaches to quantum and/or review the claim’s
calculations. At the very least, this will avoid situations
where the contractor must take a different approach to
quantum in litigation than was taken in the claim.

Third, the Federal Circuit’s “plain meaning” approach to contract
interpretation will continue to be a source of frustration to litigants
that base their claims on extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.
As the court’s decision in Bell BCI shows, the Federal Circuit will
enforce what it believes is the plain, unambiguous meaning of a
contract provision, even where the opposing party is unable to
produce any evidence that it shared that interpretation when it
executed the contract, or where that plain meaning would contradict
well-established legal rules—e.g., that a general release does not
operate to extinguish claims which could not have been known at the
723
time the release was executed. As it pertains to the interpretation
of release clauses in particular, Bell BCI may have the unfortunate
effect of complicating the negotiation of change orders, as
contractors struggle to comprehend just what they may be giving up
when they agree to a specific adjustment for a given modification.

721. S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235.
722. Daewoo Eng’g, 557 F.3d at 1338.
723. See, e.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States,
531 F.2d 1037, 1047 (Ct. Cl. 1976)) (“The rule for releases is that . . . a general
release bars claims based on events occurring prior to the date of the release”). “The
test is not the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge, but the availability of information
which, properly digested, could reasonably be expected to acquaint plaintiff with the
existence of a reimbursable cost.” Johnson, Drake, & Piper, 531 F.2d at 1048 (quoting
U.S. Rubber Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 492, 496 (Ct. Cl. 1958)). It follows
that “the critical inquiry in determining whether a release operates on a particular
claim or right is whether the claim or right can be said to exist such that a party is
capable of waiving or preserving it.” 76 C.J.S. Release § 76 (2007).
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Finally, contracting parties, the Boards, and the COFC will have
their work cut out for them applying the two-part test for recovery of
724
defense and settlement costs established in Tecom. Unquestionably,
the Federal Circuit faced a serious dilemma in that appeal—on the
one hand, the Government should not reimburse contractors for
settling meritorious sexual harassment cases, while on the other
hand, the Government should not force contractors to defend
meritless cases and incur allowable costs that exceed the cost of
settlement. The Federal Circuit appears to have determined that the
former goal is paramount, to be accomplished at the expense of the
latter.
In practice, Tecom adds several layers of complexity to what
previously was a pure business decision for government contractors.
When faced with third-party litigation, the settlement calculus now
must include the possibility that a future contracting officer will
determine that the plaintiff had more than a “very little likelihood of
success on the merits” and disallow the defense and settlement costs.
As such, many contractors may be inclined to seek pre-approval from
the contracting officer before settling third-party litigation. Yet such
communications likely would require counsel to reveal their
assessment of the litigation’s merits and could risk jeopardizing
attorney-client privilege or disclosing attorney work product to the
government. In the end, Tecom illustrates why some issues are better
dealt with through the regulatory process, namely a Federal
Acquisition Regulation rule-making, which is better equipped to take
practical ramifications into account to create a framework that both
protects the government from egregious charges and provides a
reasonable, predictable standard for contractors.

724. 566 F.3d 1037, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

